Those Disappointing Wizards

wittman confused

The surest way to get disappointed is to start with unrealistically high expectations. For exhibit gazillion, I present the 2015-16 Washington Wizards.

During the preseason, there was a fascinating disconnect between fans, media observers, and my statistical analysis. Many, including some of my stat pals at APBRmetrics thought the Wizards would be pretty good. The team seemed to fit a familiar narrative — they’d been bad, they’d gotten a taste of the playoffs (and even won a first round series) in 2013-14, and then had been better yet in 2014-15 (complete with a first round sweep of the Toronto Raptors). Fueled by All-Star John Wall and his young backcourt buddy Bradley Beal, the Wizards would take the next step and become Eastern Conference Contenders.

Over on the message board at RealGM, 76 members predicted the team’s final record. The average prediction: 48.0 wins. (Strictly speaking, 77 members made a prediction. I’m removing my own because it fits into a different category). A helpful soul compiled nine media predictions (strictly speaking, it was eight plus a betting service’s over/under line; also there are ten predictions listed, but 538’s belongs in a different category), which were only slightly less optimistic: 46.6 wins.

Roll all of those up, and it’s 85 predictions ranging from a high of 56 to a low of 37. The group pick: 47.9 wins.

The APBRmetrics crowd was less optimistic — average prediction: 44.8 wins.

My stat-based model predicted 41.4 wins, but I rounded up to 42 in my preseason analysis at Vice. The guys at 538.com predicted 41 wins.

What’s gone wrong? Nothing unexpected, really. Wall’s been maybe a little less productive than anticipated, but he’s quite close to my preseason prediction. Beal hasn’t been as good as I’d predicted — and he got hurt more than I’d expected — but that’s counterbalanced by Marcin Gortat and Otto Porter being healthier and more productive than projected.

So, was it injuries that doomed the Wizards? No. While the Wizards are near the league lead in games missed due to injury, most of the games were missed by bottom of the rotation guys — Alan Anderson, Drew Gooden, Gary Neal. Yes, Nenê and Beal missed their usual allotment. But among players who were on the roster since preseason, they’re fourth and sixth in per possession production. Washington’s three most productive players per possession (Wall, Gortat and Porter) have missed a total of 13 games.

There’s another whopping problem with the “injuries done ’em in” narrative: it’s hopelessly one-sided. For example, when I ran an estimate during the All-Star break on how many additional games the Wizards might have won at full health, I looked only at the Wizards. To do this analysis properly, however, it’s nonsensical to ignore injuries suffered by other teams.

Not having time today for a complete analysis of my own, I turn to ManGamesLost.com. That site lists the Wizards as having the third most games missed due to injury this season. They have two measures of the effect those injuries have had on the team. The Wizards rank 21st in one, and 19th in the other. In other words, injuries have cost Washington LESS in the win column than the average NBA team.

To put it more simply: the injury excuse is bullshit.

So what went wrong? Again, nothing surprising. Most of the players performed to reasonable preseason expectations. The team had been very average in preceding seasons, and several teams in the East improved while the Wizards tried to maintain their averageness.

The reason the Wizards are so disappointing is that fans and media (and apparently the players) set about constructing a narrative of a surging franchise. Unfortunately, the foundation for that narrative consisted of inflated win totals in a historically weak conference, and a massive overestimation of the importance of first round playoff wins.

Keep in mind that the playoffs represent tiny sample sizes. Last season’s postseason lasted 10 games. Washington’s record: 6-4. The previous season, it was 11 games. Their record: 6-5. At any other time in a season, such a performance would be expected for an average team. When it happens in the playoffs, it becomes a portent, an omen. And there’s a dose of that curious one-sidedness when it comes to injuries.

Many said (repeatedly) something to the effect of: “The Wizards might have beat the Hawks if only Wall hadn’t hurt his hand.” Acknowledged far less often is the reality that Washington’s first-round sweep of Toronto was helped by a serious back injury that hobbled Raptors star Kyle Lowry. If we’re going to imagine “what if” scenarios for a full-health Wizards against Atlanta, we also ought to recognize they might not have gotten out of the first round against a full-health Raptors squad.

With five games to go, the Wizards have a slim (about 2%) chance of reaching the postseason. All they need do is win out while Detroit loses three of their remaining four. But, as they limp toward the lottery (with the pick likely going to Phoenix), the team still embodies what I wrote in the preseason: it’s a mediocre roster that lacks an elite producer.

Player Production Average

The ratings below are from a metric I developed called Player Production Average (PPA). In PPA, players are credited for things they do that help a team win, and debited for things that don’t, each in proportion to what causes teams to win and lose. PPA is pace neutral, accounts for defense, and includes an adjustment based on the level of competition faced when a player is on the floor. In PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45.

League-wide PPA scores through games played 04/05/16 are here.

PLAYER	GMS	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	1/6	1/13	1/27	2/11	3/1	3/14	4/5
Marcin Gortat	71	30.3	91	112	128	133	132	138	147	145	148	151	172	169	171
John Wall	77	36.2	153	129	136	168	157	157	149	144	142	146	153	148	145
Otto Porter	70	30.8	144	158	104	116	107	115	122	127	130	130	134	126	131
J.J. Hickson	11	7.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	-14	96	108
Markieff Morris	24	26.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	41	58	95
Bradley Beal	52	31.3	128	108	96	87	87	86	85	86	98	108	94	94	95
Jared Dudley	76	26.1	36	92	90	85	98	103	100	105	99	104	106	98	89
Nene Hilario	53	19.1	58	90	80	74	79	78	79	88	92	84	86	90	82
Ramon Sessions	77	19.6	131	119	84	90	87	89	88	91	90	89	88	85	76
Alan Anderson	9	14.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	97	90	68
Marcus Thornton	11	12.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	-6	65
Garrett Temple	75	24.6	38	106	57	54	70	63	68	79	79	69	59	56	57
Jarell Eddie	22	4.5	–	–	–	–	–	153	119	113	110	86	68	51	55
Kelly Oubre	59	9.8	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43	39	36	29	22	25	27
Drew Gooden	28	10.6	99	51	57	56	56	56	38	47	34	31	26	22	22
DeJuan Blair	29	7.5	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38	-28	-6	-15	–	–	–
Gary Neal	40	20.2	23	49	64	75	78	74	75	78	71	70	69	–	–
Kris Humphries	28	16.6	90	121	95	80	78	76	79	79	78	76	–	–	–
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6	–	–	-40	60	59	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Good news: Gortat and Porter continue to play well. Leaving aside the issue of the crummy trade that acquired him, Markieff Morris has been solid after his first four games with the team.

Bad news: Wall remains significantly below the game’s elite performers, Beal continues to rate a bit below average, and key role players (Jared Dudley, Ramon Sessions and Nenê) have all seen production slip over the past few weeks.

In the “puzzling” category goes Randy Wittman’s playing time decisions. The team’s top lineup with more than 100 minutes this season has been Wall-Beal-Porter-Morris-Gortat. Their second best lineup is exactly the same except with Dudley instead of Morris. The second lineup has been together for precisely zero minutes over the past month.

Also puzzling has been the benching of Dudley, who has been a solid player for them throughout the season. Dudley seems ideal as a league average caliber player who gets around 24 minutes per game divided between SF and PF. The Wizards started him at PF much of the season, and have now slashed his minutes from 27.0 minutes per game through the first 72 games to just 14.0 over the last five — 4.5 minutes per game fewer than Garrett Temple.

The Surprising Problem for the Wizards

wall frustrated

One of The Official Narratives of the 2015-16 Washington Wizards season is that point guard John Wall is terrific, but is getting sideswiped by a substandard supporting cast. Last month, The Washington Post’s Dan Steinberg lamented that, “The saddest thing here is that the Wizards might be in the process of sacrificing a year of John Wall’s prime.”

In Michael Lee’s excellent article at Yahoo!, Wall echoed Steinberg, saying: “I ain’t trying to waste a season.”

Adam McGinnis and I touched on the subject during our podcast last week.

Alas, as is the case with many Official Narratives, there are problems.

On a per-possession basis, Wall isn’t Washington’s most productive player. That honor goes to center Marcin Gortat. Because Wall plays five more minutes per game than Gortat, Wall leads the team in total production.
Wall is not an elite player.
The overall production difference between Wall (Washington’s top producer) and Gortat (second in total production) has been vastly overstated.
The quality of Wall’s “supporting cast” isn’t bad.

Wall’s PPA (see below) is 148 this year. Among players with at least 500 minutes this season, he ranks 54th. Among point guards, he ranks 11th. Wall has had stretches of dominant play, but his performance continues to be plagued by the same bugaboos he’s had throughout his career: turnovers, poor shot selection and poor shooting. Gortat, by the way, ranks 29th in PPA.

Wall isn’t an elite player. For the past few seasons seasons (including this one, most of the year), he’s rated as a top 8-10 point guard and a top 40-50 player overall. That’s very good, but well short of the impact from elite point guards and elite players. He could be great — he was in December, for example. But his performance game-to-game is a mix of fantastic and horrible. Which averages out to very good, not elite.

The average PPA of top total producers for each team is 179 — 31 points better than Wall. Among those top 30 producers, Wall ranks 24th in per possession production — ahead of Carmelo Anthony, Rajon Rondo, Nerlens Noel, Gordon Hayward, Tyson Chandler and Jordan Clarkson.

The average top producer has provided 22.0% of his team’s production. Wall is about average at 21.8%.

The average gap between a top producer and his team’s “number two” is about 4.5%. For Wall and Gortat, it’s 2.7%. Want a player who actually fits The Official Narrative? Try New Orleans where Anthony Davis has a PPA of 189, provides 26.3% of his team’s production, and (at 13.2%) sports the biggest drop to his team’s second most productive.

Since you’re wondering, the top five in total production shares:

Stephen Curry, GSW — 29.6%
Russell Westbrook, OKC — 26.7%
James Harden, HOU — 26.4%
Lebron James, CLE — 26.3%
Anthony Davis, NOP — 26.3%

And, here’s the top five in drop-off to “number two”:

Anthony Davis, NOP — 13.2%
Stephen Curry, GSW — 12.7%
James Harden, HOU — 8.5%
Kawhi Leonard, SAS — 8.3%
Kyle Lowry, TOR — 8.2%

Wall and the Wizards are 20th.

That’s all fine, you might be saying, but The Official Narrative isn’t necessarily that Wall’s “Robin” sucks, it’s that the roster lacks depth. That lack of depth means Wall has to carry a heavier load than other franchise leaders. Unfortunately, this is also wrong.

For this question, I calculated minutes-weighted PPA (mwPPA) for each team — after deducting the production of its top player. mwPPA provides a handy way of measuring the relative quality of each team’s roster.

The league average “supporting cast” posted an mwPPA of 92. The Wizards rank 14th so far this season with a 93. Since you were wondering, here’s the top five in supporting cast mwPPA:

SAS — 124
GSW — 121
ATL — 107
OKC — 105
BOS — 104

So, to recap:

Wall isn’t elite.
The gap between Wall’s total production and Gortat’s is smaller than average for a number one to a number two.
The Wizards “supporting cast” is mediocre, not terrible.

The real problem for the Wizards is in that first bullet. Their problem: they don’t have an elite player.

Player Production Average

League-wide PPA scores through games played 3/14/16 are here.

PLAYER	GMS	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	1/6	1/13	1/27	2/11	3/1	3/14
Marcin Gortat	60	30.2	91	112	128	133	132	138	147	145	148	151	172	169
John Wall	66	35.9	153	129	136	168	157	157	149	144	142	146	153	148
Otto Porter	59	30.1	144	158	104	116	107	115	122	127	130	130	134	126
Jared Dudley	65	27.7	36	92	90	85	98	103	100	105	99	104	106	98
J.J. Hickson	6	7.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	-14	96
Bradley Beal	42	30.6	128	108	96	87	87	86	85	86	98	108	94	94
Nene Hilario	42	18.8	58	90	80	74	79	78	79	88	92	84	86	90
Alan Anderson	8	14.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	97	90
Ramon Sessions	66	20.3	131	119	84	90	87	89	88	91	90	89	88	85
Markieff Morris	14	26.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	41	58
Garrett Temple	64	25.4	38	106	57	54	70	63	68	79	79	69	59	56
Jarell Eddie	21	4.7	–	–	–	–	–	153	119	113	110	86	68	51
Kelly Oubre	53	10.7	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43	39	36	29	22	25
Drew Gooden	28	10.6	99	51	57	56	56	56	38	47	34	31	26	22
Marcus Thornton	3	15.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	-6
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6	–	–	-40	60	59	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kris Humphries	28	16.6	90	121	95	80	78	76	79	79	78	76	–	–
Gary Neal	40	20.2	23	49	64	75	78	74	75	78	71	70	69	69
DeJuan Blair	29	7.5	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38	-28	-6	-15	–	–

Randy Wittman vs. Analytics

wittman grimace

Yesterday, Wizards head coach Randy Wittman appeared Sportstalk 980’s “Sports Fix” with Kevin Sheehan and Thom Loverro (as transcribed by the Washington Post’s Dan Steinberg) and provided a treasure trove of comments worth some analysis.

Let’s unpack a bit, shall we?

Writes Steinberg:

The Wizards have their own special history with the [analytics]. There were critics throughout much of the 2014-2015 season who wanted Randy Wittman’s Wizards to play a smaller, faster, more three-point-friendly game, and who sometimes used numbers to make their case. Owner Ted Leonsis, at least in one blog post, seemed sympathetic with their cause.

ESPN the Magazine gave the Wizards a mediocre “analytics” rating, writing that “Washington lags in terms of applying the lessons of analytics to its shot chart even in the midst of the team’s best season since 1978-79.” The Wizards went smaller in the playoffs and found some success. After the season ended, the Wizards held an “analytics” scrimmage, and Leonsis defended the franchise’s use of analytics. And by the start of this season, they were debuting a faster “pace and space” offense that seemed more aligned with modern NBA thinking.

A very fair and cogent summary of the Wizards’ recent history with statistical analysis. The thing that makes me twitch is the notion that “analytics” said the Wizards should play faster. The numbers I track indicated that a) playing fast hadn’t helped the team in recent years, b) that if anything the Wizards were slightly better in slower-paced games, and c) that playing fast or slow or in-between is a bad goal because it doesn’t mean anything. There’s no prize for having a lot of possessions.

During 2014-15 (and the several preceding seasons where stat guys made similar points), the lesson from the numbers was that the Wizards could benefit by exchanging two-point jumpers for threes, at-rim attempts and free throws — to the extent possible. The team’s “go fast” approach was a leap of faith unsupported by the numbers.

From Steinberg:

At least one local critic — ESPN 980 host Kevin Sheehan — has pointed the finger at the “analytics”-inspired change.

“I wouldn’t be surprised if we find out down the road that this small lineup pace-and-space style of play was forced on Randy Wittman and his staff,” Sheehan said recently, “forced on them by some advanced-analytics stats geek who convinced the technological visionary who owns the team that this team was stuck in yesteryear, that this team was stuck in old ways of playing basketball that weren’t going to work anymore:

“Hey Ted, Ted, I’ve got this logarithm that I wrote, it’s really cool stuff, I got the idea from an app that I created for sci-fi movies and it’s really gonna work in the NBA, bad twos, you can’t take those anymore, you’ve got to take threes, you’ve got to space and pace, you’ve got to go small, you’ve got to play a stretch 4, this is the way of the future, Ted, this is the way you’ve got to do it. And Ted said to Randy ‘Hey Randy, what do you think about this pace and space and stretch 4s and shoot more threes and it worked in the playoffs and we almost made it to the Eastern Conference finals.

“Jesus!” Sheehan concluded. “This whole thing all season long is just a blown opportunity. A major blown opportunity. I would love to know what Ted is thinking right now.”

If Washington has a stat goober who told them the numbers said they should play fast, he should be fired. Second, the space part of the new offense has probably helped a bit. Last season, the team ranked 22nd in offensive efficiency, 1.9 points per 100 possessions below league average. So far this season, they rank 18th — about 1.0 points per 100 possessions below average.

This is a fairly small effect, which at least one stat goober expected before the season. The Wizards weren’t the only team to apply the lessons of statistical analysis, defenses have been adapting, and games generally come down to overall talent and execution. And the team has middle-of-the-road talent.

Washington’s real problem, of course, has been defense, which has nothing to do with pace or space. Last year, they ranked fifth overall defensively, 2.6 points per 100 possessions better than average. This year: 17th, about a half point per 100 possessions below average. Over the past two seasons (individually or combined), there was no relationship between pace and defensive efficiency.

Appearing on Sheehan and Loverro’s show, Wittman had this to say (courtesy Steinberg):

“I’ve got to coach the team. Analytics haven’t won a ballgame. You’ve got to take what you have and put guys in position that they can best succeed at. And there are some things with numbers that help that, but if you see some of the number sheets that we have, it would drive you crazy. But you know what, that’s the world we live in. You can fight that, but that does you no good. Listen, I’ve been in the business 32 years now. We had analytics back in the ’80s, alright? We had numbers. Plus-minus, and guys playing with certain guys, and that’s never changed. It’s just now, for whatever reason … Hey, it’s good for some people. Because guys have gotten a lot of jobs because of that word.”

A few thoughts. “Analytics” is the study of what wins and loses basketball games. “Analytics” are drawn from the actual games. They’re not made up. When done well, they reveal what’s really happening on the floor, pinpoint what’s important, help coaches and players identify advantages and disadvantages that can be discerned in the numbers, but might escape the naked eye. Analytics are a tool to help coaches and players perform their jobs better, and (hopefully) win more games.

Wittman’s comments suggest the Wizards have some serious internal problems, though — and NOT because he’s resistant to “analytics.” The telling statement is “…if you see some of the number sheets that we have, it would drive you crazy…”

A head coach should not be getting buried with sheets of numbers. He’s a basketball coach, not a statistical analyst. Like many busy people, when presented with an overload of information, he’s going to ignore most of it, seize on a few things he thinks he understands, and then go with what his experience tells him is the right strategy.

The proper role for a statistical analyst is to crunch the numbers, perform the analysis, and then communicate the findings in a way that coaches and decision-makers can understand. If Wittman is being driven crazy by the data, then the analysis department is failing. It sounds like the Wizards may be missing the crucial ability to communicate the findings of their analysts.

Also worth considering is the kind of numbers and information being analyzed and presented. It has become fashionable in recent years to break players into their component skills and seek to construct a roster as if completing a puzzle.

Based on comments made by GM Ernie Grunfeld, the Wizards are big into this kind of analysis. Symptoms include statements such as: the team needs to add “shooting” or “defense” or “rebounding” or “ball handling” or “length” or…you get the idea. As if “shooting” can be “added” to a lineup.

This approach has been borrowed from other sports like football or baseball, where specialists can be extremely valuable. This is much less true in a flowing game like basketball. “Adding” a shooter to the lineup means “subtracting” another player from the floor. Whatever specialty a player is put on the floor to perform, the team gets his whole game — offense and defense. So while it’s worth analyzing what guys are good at doing, it MUST be coupled with analysis of his overall impact on the game.

From Steinberg:

“And not to try to get you into trouble, but it’s been sort of a season-long question for Wizards fans, and I’m a big one,” Sheehan said. “And that is how on board were you with sort of this space-and-pace and pace-and-space and going small?”

“Well, I didn’t have big decisions to make,” Wittman said, “because after the roster was put together with the guys that left and the additions that we had, I had nobody that could back up Marcin [Gortat] at the 5 spot. Kevin Seraphin left and I had nobody there. I thought what was best for our team was to take Nene out of the starting lineup and play him more at 5 than at 4. And that was more just because of the makeup, and we had success with it.”

Good question from Sheehan. Wittman’s answer is…interesting. I agree with his point that the roster construction left him with few lineup choices. I’m baffled by his comment about Seraphin because the big fella was terrible with the Wizards and has been even worse with the Knicks.

From Steinberg:

Wittman said he’s sympathetic with armchair coaches, because he does the same thing when he’s watching baseball or football. But he noted with some amusement that last year critics said his team was playing too big, and this year other critics say his team is playing too small. He said he would run out of minutes if he started a big lineup but then also used Nene as his second-string center, but added that a bigger lineup could be used in a shorter playoff series. And he said this year’s changes have both helped Washington’s offense and hurt its defense.

“There’s no question about it, [it] hurt our rebounding a little bit as well,” he said. “And that’s an important factor for us because we want to run. If you don’t rebound the ball, you can’t run.”

The first part of this struck me as a strawman. Statistical analysis suggested the team would be better off taking fewer two-point jump shots, and that the team could probably benefit by adding a stretch-four. That doesn’t mean “playing smaller” — at least not to me.

I disagree with Wittman that the changes are what hurt the defense. And the rebounding really hasn’t suffered much at all. Last season, the Wizards were third in defensive rebounding at 77.3%. This year, they’ve fallen to tenth, but their defensive rebounding percentage is still a robust 77.0%. More teams than ever are opting to emphasize getting back on defense rather than going for offensive rebounds.

If it’s not rebounding, what’s causing the decline in Washington’s defense? Answer: an inability to make opponents miss. Like last year, the team still does a good job keeping opponents out of the paint (fifth best at preventing opponent at-rim attempts; down from third best last year). However, opponent efficiency on at-rim and three-point attempts has improved. That could be about playing smaller lineups (taller players tend to force lower opponent shooting percentages), but it could be something else such as less effective close-outs on three-point attempts, and/or random variation.

Bottom line: bad analytics didn’t sabotage the Wizards — at least not at the coaching level. What’s hampered them this year is the reality that they have very average talent across the board.

Player Production Average

League-wide PPA scores through games played 3/1/16 are here.

PLAYER	GMS	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	1/6	1/13	1/27	2/11	3/1
Marcin Gortat	53	31.0	91	112	128	133	132	138	147	145	148	151	172
John Wall	59	35.9	153	129	136	168	157	157	149	144	142	146	153
Otto Porter	52	30.5	144	158	104	116	107	115	122	127	130	130	134
Jared Dudley	58	28.4	36	92	90	85	98	103	100	105	99	104	106
Alan Anderson	3	16.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	97
Bradley Beal	38	31.0	128	108	96	87	87	86	85	86	98	108	94
Ramon Sessions	59	20.4	131	119	84	90	87	89	88	91	90	89	88
Nene Hilario	35	18.7	58	90	80	74	79	78	79	88	92	84	86
Gary Neal	40	20.2	23	49	64	75	78	74	75	78	71	70	69
Jarell Eddie	18	5.0	–	–	–	–	–	153	119	113	110	86	68
Garrett Temple	57	25.3	38	106	57	54	70	63	68	79	79	69	59
Markieff Morris	7	24.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	41
Drew Gooden	27	10.8	99	51	57	56	56	56	38	47	34	31	26
Kelly Oubre	48	11.2	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43	39	36	29	22
J.J. Hickson	2	5.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	-14
Kris Humphries	28	16.6	90	121	95	80	78	76	79	79	78	76	–
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6	–	–	-40	60	59	–	–	–	–	–	–
DeJuan Blair	29	7.5	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38	-28	-6	-15	–

On a per minute basis, Gortat remains the Wizards’ top producer. Wall leads in total production because he plays more minutes.

Markieff Morris has had a rough start to his career in Washington, but should improve over time.

A Bit More on the Trade for Markieff Morris

markieff-morris

In talking with fans, I’ve pulled up all kinds of information about Markieff Morris. Here are a few observations that came mostly from examining the claims made by folks who support the acquisition:

2014-15 was the best season of Morris career. He posted a Player Production Average (PPA) of 102 (see below for a brief explanation). Among the 81 players identified by Basketball-Reference as PF who received at least 500 minutes, Morris ranked 36th.
Morris ranked 17th among PFs in total production last season, which would sound better if I omitted mention that he was second in total minutes played.
Last season, among the 27 PFs who played at least 500 minutes and had a usage rate of 20% or higher (I had Morris at 22.0% last season), Morris ranked 24th in offensive efficiency.
In the defense part of PPA, Morris rated slightly better than average last season. Not a good defender, but not terrible either.
Among those 81 PFs last season, Morris ranked 62nd in rebounds per 100 team possessions. This season, Morris ranks 49th among 66 PFs with at least 500 minutes.
While his work on the boards is a weakness, Morris could actually improve Washington’s rebounding by taking minutes from Jared Dudley. It was a bad idea for the team to rely so heavily on Dudley — a poor rebounder at SF — as the team’s PF. Dudley is the worst rebounding PF in the league. He trails second worst Luc Mbah a Moute by more than a rebound per 100 team possessions.
Morris has played badly this year. Some trade supporters have mentioned Morris averaging 20.6 points and 7.6 rebounds per game in the month of February. Two primary problems here — first: the “month” is five games so far, which is to say Small Sample Size Theater; and second: Morris has scored more by shooting more. His offensive rating in those five “good” games was a below-average 102 points per 100 possessions, and his rebound rate was below average. Overall, Morris posted a PPA of 86 in February. Better than the season average by a bunch, but still below the league average.
There’s a false narrative circulating that Morris saw his production drop last season (2014-15) after the Suns traded away their backcourt. His PPA was 147 15 games into the season. It bounced around in the 120-130 range, but trended down for the next 30 games. His PPA fell below 120 in the 48th game of the season — January 30 — and continued to decline from there. As of the last game BEFORE the trades, his PPA was just 103. With his new teammates the rest of the way, his PPA was 101. He finished the season with a PPA of 102.

markieff 2014-15 rolling ppa

Player Production Average (PPA) is a metric I developed in which players are credited for things they do that help a team win, and debited for things that don’t, each in proportion to what causes teams to win and lose. PPA is pace neutral, accounts for defense, and includes an adjustment based on the level of competition faced when a player is on the floor. In PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45.

A First Look at the Wizards Trade for Morris

markieff

In a trade deadline deal, the Washington Wizards acquired power forward Markieff Morris from the Phoenix Suns in exchange for power forward Kris Humphries, forward/center DeJuan Blair, and a first round pick (protected through the top nine picks).

It’s a surprisingly high price to pay for a player who combines Morris’ lack of production with personality issues. It’s also a signal of the front office’s desperation to make the playoffs.

The issue, of course, is that first round pick. Humphries has been injured and below average this season; Blair apparently forgot how to play basketball when he arrived in DC.

What’s that pick going to be worth? Three or four years ago, I used PER to evaluate the expected value of draft picks. Picks 10-14 (where Washington’s pick is likely to fall when they miss the playoffs) have an average four-year PER of 14.5. Morris’ career PER: 14.8. In PER, average is 15.

According to PER, Morris’ peak (so far) was an 18.4 coming off the bench in 2013-14. He followed that up with a 15.8 last season, and an 11.1 this year. So hey, crummy players and a pick who might turn out to be average for a guy who’s been average and had some personal problems this year. Not bad, right?

Well, in my analysis Morris hasn’t been that good. According to Player Production Average (PPA), the metric I developed, Morris has a well-below average 79 (in PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45). Here’s his year-by-year PPA scores:

2011-12 — 52
2012-13 — 70
2013-14 — 97
2014-15 — 102
2015-16 — 27

What’s behind the difference between PPA and PER? Three key items:

PER rewards players for taking more shots so long as they make about 28% of them; PPA does not.
PPA accounts for defense; PER does not.
PPA includes a “degree of difficulty” factor based on the level of competition faced; PER does not.

What to like about the trade? Morris isn’t old — at 26, he should be entering his prime years. And he’s signed at a flat $8 million per year for the next three seasons after this one. With the cap expected to rise $40 million over the next two seasons, that salary could end up being a relative bargain even with meh production.

What kind of player are the Wizards getting? I ran Morris’ best year (2014-15) through my statistical doppelganger machine — just waving away his crummy play this year. The machine kicked out names like Lamond Murray, Keith Van Horn, Tim Thomas, Morris Peterson, Al Harrington, and Thaddeus Young, with repeat seasons from Thomas and Harrington.

Bucks fans probably remember Grunfeld trading for Thomas, and then awarding him a massive contract — despite thoroughly pedestrian play from Thomas.

Best case scenario, the Wizards get the Morris of 2014-15. He was inefficient on offense and was basically average in the non-scoring part of his game, but he’ll at least be as good as Jared Dudley overall.

Quick addendum: I used PPA to project the Wizards record over their final 31 games assuming they’d get the Morris from 2014-15. That’s a PPA of 102, and represents the best he’s played over a sustained stretch.

For the projection, I assumed perfect health (no one misses any games for any reason), and the following nine-man rotation:

Wall 36 mpg
Beal 33
Porter 32
Gortat 32
Morris 32
Dudley 28
Nenê 16
Sessions 15
Temple 12

After a bit of math, my PPA Wins Projection Machine says Washington will go 16-15 over its final 31 games. That would leave the team with a 39-43 record, and a likely ninth or tenth place finish. Odds are: Phoenix would get the pick in this year’s draft.

Reality vs. the Wizards

The Wizards are not going to make the playoffs this year. They’re not quite as good as they’ve been the past couple years, which is to say they’re a bit worse than mediocre.

Wizards fans — and perhaps the Wizards themselves — are hanging their dreams of postseason participation on some fragile hooks:

the schedule gets easier, and
key Wizards players have returned from injury.

Neither factor holds as much promise for the Wizards as adherents might imagine. The schedule does get easier, but the Wizards are five games below .500 because they’ve played below average basketball through their first 51 games, not because the schedule was difficult.

Before the All-Star break, Washington’s opponents were 0.67 points per game better than average. That’s the approximate quality of a 43-win team over an 82-game schedule. Against this very slightly better than average level of competition, the Wizards got outscored by 2.7 points per game. Which means Washington performed about two points per game worse than average.

The schedule does get easier. Opponents the rest of the way have been a point per game worse than average the rest of the way — about the quality of a 38-win team over an 82-game schedule. In other words, the Wizards are going from playing the approximate quality of an eighth or ninth place team to playing opponents the approximate quality of a ninth or tenth place team.

There are a couple problems, though. First, the Wizards have been worse by a point per game than the aggregate of their remaining opponents. And second, 17 of their remaining games are on the road, and the post All-Star break sprint starts with three games in three nights.

Run the numbers on their remaining schedule, and at this point they’d be the favorite in 11 of their remaining 31 games. If you believe (as I do) the real quality of the team is about average, they’ll probably win between 14 and 17 games the rest of the way – meaning they’d finish with 37 to 40 wins, and would miss the playoffs.

So what about the injuries? The Wizards have indeed lost the NBA’s highest number of player games to injury so far this season. Unfortunately, the players who missed games weren’t the team’s major producers of wins, and their replacements did a reasonable job filling in.

Prior to the All-Star break, I used PPA to quantify how much injuries cost the team. That involved reapportioning minutes (taking playing time from Garrett Temple, Gary Neal and others, and assigning it to players who missed time like Bradley Beal, Nenê, and others). Based on the performance levels of the players involved, I estimate the team would have won two additional games with perfect health.

Two wins is a significant number, but it wouldn’t change the overall trajectory of the season. Washington would be 25-26 – closer to eighth in the East, but still in ninth or tenth place. Even with an easier schedule the rest of the way, the numbers in this “ideal health” scenario would project the Wizards to finish with 41 to 42 wins, and a likely ninth place finish.

Washington still has a theoretical chance to finish eighth. Chicago and Charlotte have suffered injuries — Jimmy Butler’s being far more damaging to the Bulls than Michael Kidd-Gilchrist’s to the Hornets. But, the eighth seed in the East is going to need a minimum of 42 wins, and to do even that well, the Wizards would need to transmogrify from playing like a 37-win team to playing like a 50-win team.

Here’s a simple table showing the task the Wizards have created for themselves. It’s not impossible for them to make the playoffs, but it is highly improbable. The W82 column shows the quality level the Wizards would need to reach the target wins. So, to reach 44 wins this season, they’d need to finish 21-10, which is the approximate level of a 56-win team over an 82-game schedule.

TARGET		NEED		W82
W	L	W	L
44	38	21	10	56
43	39	20	11	53
42	40	19	12	50

Player Production Average

League-wide PPA scores through games played 2/11/16 are here.

PLAYER	GMS	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	1/6	1/13	1/27	2/11
Marcin Gortat	45	31.2	91	112	128	133	132	138	147	145	148	151
John Wall	51	36.1	153	129	136	168	157	157	149	144	142	146
Otto Porter	44	31.0	144	158	104	116	107	115	122	127	130	130
Bradley Beal	30	31.8	128	108	96	87	87	86	85	86	98	108
Jared Dudley	50	28.9	36	92	90	85	98	103	100	105	99	104
Ramon Sessions	51	20.4	131	119	84	90	87	89	88	91	90	89
Jarell Eddie	14	5.6	–	–	–	–	–	153	119	113	110	86
Nene Hilario	28	18.8	58	90	80	74	79	78	79	88	92	84
Kris Humphries	28	16.6	90	121	95	80	78	76	79	79	78	76
Gary Neal	40	20.2	23	49	64	75	78	74	75	78	71	70
Garrett Temple	49	25.6	38	106	57	54	70	63	68	79	79	69
Drew Gooden	22	12.4	99	51	57	56	56	56	38	47	34	31
Kelly Oubre	43	11.9	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43	39	36	29
DeJuan Blair	29	7.5	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38	-28	-6	-15
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6	–	–	-40	60	59	–	–	–	–	–

Beal has returned from injury playing well. Wall, Gortat and Porter continue to lead the team in production. The numbers indicate the Wizards actually have some decent professional players. What they lack is an elite producer. More on that coming tomorrow.

Wizards Update: All-Star Edition

All-Star rosters will be released tonight, and while Wizards point guard John Wall will likely be selected, he’s borderline at best, and wouldn’t make the team if I was making the picks. I’ve looked at the numbers several different ways — total production, per game production, per minute production — and Wall remains just on the fringes of the All-Star roster.

This is in no small part because of the fan vote, which picked the starters in each conference. In the East, at least according to my analysis, Dwyane Wade, Paul George and Carmelo Anthony are undeserving of All-Star status — even as reserves. This pushes all guards down one spot, and all front-court players down two. In my analysis, the next guard up for the East: John Wall. The next front-court guys: Greg Monroe and Al Horford.

In the West, the only poor choice was Kobe Bryant, who received a career achievement honorific. The next deserving front-court player was Blake Griffin, whose injury would have pushed to next man up Dwight Howard.

Here’s the way Player Production Average (my metric, see below) would divvy up the teams:

POS	EAST	WEST
G	Kyle Lowry	Stephen Curry
G	Dwyane Wade	Russell Westbrook
F	Lebron James	Kobe Bryant
F	Paul George	Kevin Durant
F	Carmelo Anthony	Kawhi Leonard
G	Jimmy Butler	Chris Paul
G	Kemba Walker	James Harden
F	Paul Millsap	Draymond Green
F	Hassan Whiteside	Anthony Davis
F	Andre Drummond	DeAndre Jordan
G	Isaiah Thomas	Damian Lillard
F	Chris Bosh	Derrick Favors

My guess is that Wall will probably be chosen over Walker and that Horford will make it over Whiteside. In the West, I’d anticipate Thompson over Lillard and Howard or Demarcus Cousins over Favors.

Those Mediocre Wizards

Talk about the Wizards potentially becoming trade deadline “sellers” inspired me to apply my “Real Trade Value” toy in an all-new way to measure the team’s pervasive mediocrity.

I haven’t written much about Real Trade Value, which is still a work-in-progress. RTV attempts to determine the trade value of each player in relation to the league’s MVP. In RTV, there’s accounting for age (younger players get a bonus; older players get a deduction), and total production and per minute production are given equal weight. So, RTV “likes” players who are young, productive and durable.

There’s no accounting (yet) for contract or position.

In RTV, the top value (this year it’s Stephen Curry) is set at 1,000. Other players are scaled beneath. The idea is similar to the NFL draft pick value sheet. A theoretical trade for Curry would cost 1,000 RTV points. Here are the players closest to each 100-point mark:

1,000 — Stephen Curry
900 — Kawhi Leonard
800 — no one (here’s how outlandish Curry and Leonard have been: Curry’s RTV is 1,000; Leonard’s is 878; next closest is Westbrook at 721)
700 — Russell Westbrook, Andre Drummond, Kevin Durant, Karl-Anthony Towns, Anthony Davis
600 — Greg Monroe, Hassan Whiteside
500 — Al Horford, Kevin Love, Derrick Favors, Paul George, Clint Capela, Chris Bosh
400 — Zaza Pachulia, Mike Conley, C.J. McCollum, LaMarcus Aldridge, Enes Kanter
300 — Ryan Anderson, Bismack Biyombo, T.J. McConnell, Jrue Holiday, Jeff Teague
200 — Trevor Booker, Kyle Anderson, Frank Kaminsky, Jeremy Lin, Ramon Sessions
100 — Mike Muscala, Jamal Crawford, E’Twaun Moore, Jameer Nelson, Kevin Martin
0 — Vince Carter, Sasah Vujacic, Emmanuel Mudiay, Markieff Morris

Got all that? There’ll be a quiz later.

In terms of actual trade value, contracts and position almost certainly need to be included. But, for looking at franchise health — weighing productivity and health vs. age — it works reasonably well.

Here’s a table with the results, sorted by conference.

TEAM	CONF	NBA RANK	CONF RANK	FRANCHISE HEALTH INDEX
BOS	E	5	1	77
ORL	E	6	2	75
ATL	E	7	3	74
TOR	E	8	4	74
CLE	E	10	5	71
MIL	E	12	6	70
IND	E	13	7	69
CHO	E	14	8	69
WAS	E	19	9	65
NYK	E	20	10	65
DET	E	21	11	64
MIA	E	24	12	62
CHI	E	25	13	62
PHI	E	27	14	59
BRK	E	28	15	59
GSW	W	1	1	100
OKC	W	2	2	89
SAS	W	3	3	84
UTA	W	4	4	78
NOP	W	9	5	72
DEN	W	11	6	70
HOU	W	15	7	69
LAC	W	16	8	69
POR	W	17	9	68
MIN	W	18	10	67
SAC	W	22	11	63
PHO	W	23	12	63
DAL	W	26	13	61
MEM	W	29	14	52
LAL	W	30	15	52

The last column is a “franchise health” index where the top team (Golden State) is set at 100 and other teams are scaled below. The Wizards rank 19th overall and 9th in the East. League average “index” score is 69, indicating they rate a little below average.

IF this measure has any predictive value at the team level (and that’s a HUGE “if” because I’ve done precisely zero research on that question), the Wizards have significant work ahead of them to upgrade the roster.

Player Production Average

The ratings below are a from a metric I developed called Player Production Average (PPA). In PPA, players are credited for things they do that help a team win, and debited for things that don’t, each in proportion to what causes teams to win and lose. PPA is pace neutral, accounts for defense, and includes an adjustment based on the level of competition faced when a player is on the floor. In PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45.

League-wide PPA scores through games played 01/27/16 are here.

PLAYER	GMS	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	1/6	1/13	1/27
Marcin Gortat	37	31.7	91	112	128	133	132	138	147	145	148
John Wall	43	35.7	153	129	136	168	157	157	149	144	142
Otto Porter	36	32.1	144	158	104	116	107	115	122	127	130
Jarell Eddie	11	6.9	–	–	–	–	–	153	119	113	110
Jared Dudley	42	28.7	36	92	90	85	98	103	100	105	99
Bradley Beal	22	32.9	128	108	96	87	87	86	85	86	98
Nene Hilario	22	18.4	58	90	80	74	79	78	79	88	92
Ramon Sessions	43	21.2	131	119	84	90	87	89	88	91	90
Garrett Temple	41	24.7	38	106	57	54	70	63	68	79	79
Kris Humphries	27	17.1	90	121	95	80	78	76	79	79	78
Gary Neal	35	21.1	23	49	64	75	78	74	75	78	71
Kelly Oubre	36	13.4	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43	39	36
Drew Gooden	14	13.8	99	51	57	56	56	56	38	47	34
DeJuan Blair	26	7.9	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38	-28	-6
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6	–	–	-40	60	59	–	–	–	–

The numbers aren’t too encouraging. Wall has followed up his Player of the Month December with a thoroughly meh January. If the Wizards are going to get back in contention for a spot in the playoffs, they need something closer to the December Wall than they’ve been getting.

Wizards Update: Level Best

It may seem strange to worry about the Wizards making the playoffs this season when they still have 49 games to play, but history suggests they’re already running out of time to turn things around and reach the postseason.

It’s likely going to take 45 wins to earn the eighth seed in this year’s East. With Washington at 15-18, simple math says they’ll need another 30 wins in their final 49 games. That means playing at about .600 level the rest of the way — basically at the level of a 50-win team (over an 82-game schedule).

This is possible and not unprecedented in basketball history. Teams have dramatically improved after a poor start. But not many of them. Teams that started a season like the Wizards were much more likely to remain at the same level than markedly improve. One of those teams (the 04-05 Denver Nuggets) made two coaching changes and played .800 ball (32-8) to finish the season with 49 wins. That record is a dreamworld best-case fantasy, though.

In the real world, last season’s Wizards actually began the year a 31-18 record in their first 49 games. That’s a .633 winning percentage, and if they could replicate it over the final 49 games of this season they’d end up with 46 wins and a berth in the playoffs. Last year in reverse has a patina of plausibility, which makes it seem more possible than the evidence indicates.

Unfortunately, there are several good reasons to think that quality of play is unlikely. Since that 31-18 start, the Wizards are 36-40 — 15-18 to finish 2014-15, 6-4 in the playoffs, and 15-18 this season. That’s the quality of a 37-win team across a BIG stretch (93% of a regular season). And it’s notably consistent.

In addition, the team’s scoring differential through that 49-game stretch suggested they weren’t quite as good as their record. Scoring differential analysis indicated a 28-win team during that stretch — about the level of a 46-win team over an 82-game schedule, not the 51-win level suggested by their 31-18 record. At 33 games last season, the team was 22-11 — about three wins ahead of their expected win total. The difference wasn’t an indication that the Wizards “knew how to win” or had become “clutch,” it was a signal that the team wasn’t as good as their record.

And here’s where things get even more worrisome for the 2015-16 edition of the Wizards: their scoring differential says they’re the quality of a 13-win team through their first 33 games. Their won/loss record is running about two games ahead of their expected wins. This is a sign of weakness. Widely perceived as under-performing, the team is actually playing even worse than their already bad record. Their winning percentage is that of a 37-win team over an 82-game schedule. Their scoring differential suggests they’re playing at the level of a 32-win team. Another way of looking at it: they’re 19th in winning percentage, and 22nd in scoring differential.

The task ahead of them is not impossible. They could improve, and they are just 2.5 games from the eighth seed. But it’s time for some urgency. It’s time for them to start playing at a higher level and to string together wins. Because with every additional loss, the goal of making the playoffs this season becomes less and less probable.

Player Production Average

The ratings below are a metric I developed called Player Production Average (PPA). In PPA, players are credited for things they do that help a team win, and debited for things that don’t, each in proportion to what causes teams to win and lose. PPA is pace neutral, accounts for defense, and includes an adjustment based on the level of competition faced when a player is on the floor. In PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45.

League-wide PPA scores through games played 01/06/16 are here.

PLAYER	GAMES	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	12/30	PPA
John Wall	33	35.7	153	129	136	168	157	157	149
Marcin Gortat	30	31.2	91	112	128	133	132	138	147
Otto Porter	30	32.2	144	158	104	116	107	115	122
Jarell Eddie	5	11.6						153	119
Jared Dudley	32	27.8	36	92	90	85	98	103	100
Ramon Sessions	33	21.3	131	119	84	90	87	89	88
Bradley Beal	17	36.5	128	108	96	87	87	86	85
Kris Humphries	27	17.1	90	121	95	80	78	76	79
Nene Hilario	13	17.0	58	90	80	74	79	78	79
Gary Neal	25	22.1	23	49	64	75	78	74	75
Garrett Temple	31	22.8	38	106	57	54	70	63	68
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6			-40	60	59	59	59
Kelly Oubre	26	13.4	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37	43
Drew Gooden	7	11.6	99	51	57	56	56	56	38
DeJuan Blair	18	8.4	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38	-38

Wall’s season has been…odd. He was mediocre through the first month of the season, posting a PPA of just 94. When the calendar shifted to December, he abruptly transmogrified into an All-NBA caliber point guard, posting a December PPA of 202. Then in January, he’s posted three straight crummy games, and has a PPA of just 86. His wildly vacillating performance level gives ample ammunition to fans who believe he should be starting the All-Star game (look at the sensational play in December), as well as those who think other players are more deserving (look at the bad first month of the year). In PPA, he’s a borderline All-Star candidate — fifth among guards in the East (minimum 750 minutes), but with frontcourt players rated ahead of him.

History Hates This Year’s Wizards

USP NBA: WASHINGTON WIZARDS AT DETROIT PISTONS S BKN USA MI

NBA history has a few things to say about the Wizards, but not much of it is encouraging. Washington could radically improve — there are teams that started similar to the Wizards and got better — but the most likely outcome is a losing record, a trip to the lottery, and the possibility of a coaching change.

Combing through the archives at Basketball-Reference produced 39 teams since 1985-86 that had an efficiency differential through their first 32 games similar to Washington’s -3.2. Records varied from a high of 17 (two teams) to a low of 10 (six teams). The group average 12.9 wins — trailing Washington’s 15, but right in line with their expected wins (based on scoring differential).

Some teams like the Wizards (to the same point in the season) went remarkably different directions. At the low end are the 2012-13 Magic, which started 12-20 and managed just eight wins the rest of the season.

At the other extreme are the 2004-05 Nuggets, which started 14-18, fired head coach Jeff Bzdelik, and then finished out the year on a 32-8 run after hiring George Karl. The Nuggets earned the 7th seed in the playoffs, and lost in the first round.

Just 10 of the 39 teams finished with a record of .500 or better. Only four finished the season with a positive schedule-adjusted scoring differential.

On average, the group finished with 33.8 wins and a schedule-adjusted scoring differential of -2.62. Teams like the Wizards did improve, but only by about 0.8 wins per 82 games. Ten teams made the playoffs, but only one (the 2001-02 Charlotte Hornets) could win a series.

Ten teams fired coaches mid-season, but there was no better/worse trend from the changes. Some teams got better after a coaching change; some got worse. Twelve teams made coaching changes after the season. Six teams fired coaches mid-season, AND made a coaching change after the season.

Teams like the Wizards on average:

Record: 33.8-48.2
Average schedule-adjusted scoring differential: -2.62
.500 or better winning percentage: 26%
Average conference finish: 10.3
Made playoffs: 26%
Won a playoff series: 3%
In-season coaching change: 26%
Post-season coaching change: 31%

Three teams were 15-17 after their first 32 games with an efficiency differential about the same Washington’s. Only one of those teams made the playoffs (the 1992-93 Atlanta Hawks). The Hawks finished 43-39, got the 7th seed, and lost in the first round. After the season, they replaced Bob Weiss with Lenny Wilkens and won 57 games.

The other 15-17 teams — the 2008-09 New Jersey Nets, and the 1994-95 Dallas Mavericks — finished with 34 and 36 wins respectively. Both missed the playoffs, and neither made a coaching change.

Barring significant improvement from the Wizards, the most likely outcome is 35-38 wins and a scoring differential of around -2.0. While Washington is only 2.5 games out of 8th place in the East, it will probably take 44-45 wins. And they have to pull ahead of four other teams in contention for that spot.

There’s still 50 games remaining in the season, so there’s definitely still time for the Wizards to turn things around and salvage the season. Unfortunately, it’s rare for teams that started a year like them to have a happy ending.

Wizards Update: Mediocrity, Naturally

Sports fandom involves some cognitive bias. We assign importance to patterns without real meaning, see signs in events that are essentially random. We hope for the best and steadfastly convince ourselves this is the time things finally work out for the good guys. Long-time Wizards fans are experts at this kind of thing. Our brains are wired for it.

For example, the Wizards won four games in a row before falling to the Clippers and Raptors. Winning streaks are usually interpreted as a sign that a team is good. They’re finding their groove, hitting their stride, getting a rhythm. Right?

Well, no, actually. Long streaks, like Golden State’s (or Philadelphia’s) to start the season provide meaningful information about the relative quality of those teams. But, for virtually every NBA team, including a mediocre one like the Wizards, three- and four-game streaks are inevitable. According to the handy table in Dean Oliver’s 2004 book, Basketball On Paper, a team that wins half its games during an 82-game season has a 99.4% chance of winning four in a row at some point. Naturally, that .500 team has the same odds of losing four in a row. By their 28th game, the Wizards had accomplished both, plus an independent three-game winning streak.

A .400 team — one that would win about 33 games — has an 87% chance of winning at least four in a row during an 82-game season. Even a 25-win team has nearly a 50% chance of at least one four-game winning streak.

Sometimes randomness is fun, like Rasual Butler’s hot streak last season, or Gary Neal’s this year, or Garrett Temple’s binge of three straight games with at least 20 points. Other times, it’s not so fun, like Butler’s second half of the season, or any of Neal’s “non-hot” games, or the dud performances Temple produced in the games preceding and following the scoring outburst.

This is not meant to be a nihilistic “everything is random and therefore meaningless” screed. Some teams and players are better than others. But, the true quality of a team is found by what they do on average, over time.

The Wizards in recent years have been decidedly, consistently, mediocre. I can hear the arguing already: 46 wins last season; 44 wins the year before; trips to the second round of the playoffs both years. These are signs of the Wizards being a team on the rise that’s hoarding cap space for a run at a superstar, and they’ve had some bad luck with injuries this season. Maybe. But, more likely: fan-think.

In an 82-game season, how many games would a truly mediocre team win? The easy answer is 41. That’s exactly half, right in the middle. Therefore, 46 wins is five better than average, which means the Wizards were better than average. This isn’t wrong — just incomplete.

Let’s imagine a team that’s perfectly mediocre in quality. By the end of an 82-game season, it will score exactly as many points as its opponent. How many games will this mediocre team win? They might win 41, but they might win a few more or a few less. Their win total depends on how those points get distributed. Having a 50% chance of winning each individual game doesn’t mean a team will actually win half the games.

For a simple randomness test, google up a coin-flipping simulator or flip a coin yourself. Just for kicks, I ran a coin-flip simulator on 11 sets of 82 trials, one set of 66 trials, and one set of 30 trials. Astute readers might notice the number of “trials” matches the number of regular season games the Wizards have played since Ernie Grunfeld became president.

Of the 998 trials, heads came up 516 times — 51.8% of the time. Variance, right off the bat. If “heads” equals “wins” (and it does here because it’s my blog), that works out to about 42.5 “wins” per 82 games.

Here are the “win” results from each set of the 82 coin-flip trials:

In other words, in a random test where each independent coin flip has identical odds of producing a win or a loss, there’s a low of 35 wins and a high of 53. For the heck of it, I ran the simulation again and got a cumulative “winning percentage” of .454 with a high of 43 and a low of 34. Remember: this is totally random. A perfectly mediocre team could see its actual win total vary significantly from .500.

Which brings me back to the Wizards. There are a few good measures of relative team strength besides record. Chief among these are scoring differential, and efficiency differential, which are basically the same thing, and those same measures adjusted by strength of schedule.

Those differential numbers (adjusted for strength of schedule or not) can be used to estimate how many games each team would be expected to win. Last season, for example, the Wizards’ scoring differential suggested a team that would win 42-43 games. Winning 46 felt good, but was probably more about random outcomes for a mediocre team. The playoff “runs” were hella fun to watch, but represent a small sample size that’s even more prone to random variation. In other words, us fans (and maybe folks in the league as well) overrate results from the first round of playoffs.

Let’s go back to Team Perfectly Mediocre, and let’s say they’ve met their match in the first round of the playoffs. We’ll call the opponent: the Toronto Raptors. Who’s going to win this festival of random mediocrity? It might be a closely-matched, 4-3 series, but maybe not. I replicated 10 seven-game series for Team Mediocre vs. the Raptors, and the “series” went seven games three times, and six games three times. It also had three consecutive “sweeps” and one five-game series. Remember: this is totally random.

Back to the Wizards. Since Grunfeld took over Washington’s basketball operations before the 2003-04 season, the team has been meaningfully worse than mediocre, even allowing for randomness. Under Grunfeld’s leadership — now in its 13th season — Washington has won 417 out of 998 regular season games. That’s a winning percentage of .418. Just to see, I ran the “perfectly mediocre” test of Grunfeld’s 998-game (so far) term with the Wizards 10,000 times and couldn’t come up with a variance close to Washington’s actual performance. This is a fancy way of saying the Wizards have been truly bad under Grunfeld.

Over the course of his 12 full seasons, the Wizards have compiled a record of .500 or better six times, but have managed a positive scoring margin just three times. Grunfeld’s teams in Washington have averaged 34.3 wins per 82 games — slightly outpacing the 33.9 predicted by scoring differential and the 33.3 predicted by adjusted scoring differential.

If the 998 games represented a single, massively long basketball contest, the Wizards have been outscored by 2,467 points with Grunfeld at the helm.

Player Production Average

League-wide PPA scores through games played 12/30/15 are here.

PLAYER	GAMES	MPG	11/10	11/22	12/3	12/13	12/21	PPA
John Wall	30	35.5	153	129	136	168	157	157
Jarell Eddie	3	12.7						153
Marcin Gortat	27	31.2	91	112	128	133	132	138
Otto Porter	27	32.0	144	158	104	116	107	115
Jared Dudley	29	27.4	36	92	90	85	98	103
Ramon Sessions	30	21.0	131	119	84	90	87	89
Bradley Beal	17	36.5	128	108	96	87	87	86
Nene Hilario	12	17.4	58	90	80	74	79	78
Kris Humphries	25	17.5	90	121	95	80	78	76
Gary Neal	24	22.1	23	49	64	75	78	74
Garrett Temple	28	21.5	38	106	57	54	70	63
Ryan Hollins	5	9.6			-40	60	59	59
Drew Gooden	6	12.8	99	51	57	56	56	56
Kelly Oubre	23	12.7	-103	-4	-40	-44	9	37
DeJuan Blair	18	8.4	-345	-129	-112	-45	-34	-38

The basic message in the numbers: Wall and Gortat need help. The Wizards don’t have starter-quality players at power forward, shooting guard or (arguably) small forward. Wall remains in the good-not-great range; Gortat’s production is still solid, but diminished significantly from last season.

The other basic message: Wall and Gortat need help fast. Teams in the East have improved, and it’s probably going to take 44-45 wins to make the playoffs. The Wizards are on pace for 38. To reach 45 wins, they’ll need to go 31-21 over their remaining games — about the pace of a 49-win team. Theoretically possible, but not very likely. Barring a major turnaround, the conversation about the Wizards in April won’t be about their matchup in the playoffs, but about their odds of getting the top pick in the draft lottery.

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