What Are the Wizards Getting In Glen Rice Jr.?

Here’s the challenge in assessing what kind of pro Glen Rice Jr. could become: how to assess his performance in the NBA Development League. When I ran Rice’s college numbers through my stat-driven draft analysis machine (dubbed Ye Olde Draft Analyzer, or YODA for short), I became an instant skeptic of the team giving up two second round picks to get him. But after further analysis, the Wizards may have found a potential contributor.

When the Wizards swapped those picks for Rice, there were two players available that had late first round grades in YODA: Nate Wolters and Zeke Marshall. Wolters was taken the pick after Rice, and ended up in Milwaukee. Marshall went undrafted and ended up signing to play in Poland.

I had not been enamored with Rice in my pre-draft analysis, but my pre-draft analysis didn’t include an in-depth look at Rice’s D-League play. And that performance suggests that they Wizards have found a youngster with the ability to be a solid backup at SG or SF.

But let’s back up. Why was I skeptical? Answer: Rice’s college performance was unimpressive. As a freshman, he had a second round grade in YODA. As a sophomore and a junior, he landed solidly in “do not draft” territory. Not “don’t draft in the first round,” but rather — don’t draft at all. Rice did improve his rebounding during his college career, but he was inefficient offensively and exhibited sub-par shooting from both the three-point line and the free throw line. The add in the arrest and other “character issues” and it’s not exactly a recipe for future NBA success.

Then he went to the D-League and did an abrupt about face. He converted a high percentage from two-point range, shot well from downtown, and boosted his free throw percentage to about the NBA average. He rebounded well, handed out assists, stole the ball, blocked shots, and trimmed his turnover rate. In short, he grew up and began to produce at the level of his purported talent level.

If he’d produced like that as an NCAA senior (assuming he played a schedule of average difficulty), he’d have rated as a mid-first round pick in YODA — even with a ding for those “character issues.” Of course, that was D-League production, not college. And I haven’t done sufficient research to determine whether the level of competition is comparable.

With the exhibition season starting tonight, we’ll soon get a sense for what Rice will be able to do. Based on what he did in the D-League, it’s safe to say that he at least has the potential to be a useful NBA player. Which would be a good outcome to get from a couple of second round picks.

What Upgrade?

Since the Washington Wizards signed free agent Eric Maynor on the opening day of free agency, it’s been widely accepted that the team had found an upgrade at backup point guard from A.J. Price.

I’ve been over the data several times now, and I still can’t find justification for the belief that replacing Price with Maynor improves the team. It’s a different name at a higher salary, but better? Not unless Maynor improves significantly.

Through four seasons, Maynor has been pedestrian. As regular readers know, I’ve developed an overall rating stat I call Player Production Average (PPA for short). PPA is derived primarily from the box score, with each category weighted according to how it relates to a team’s scoring differential. In PPA, I account for defense, adjust for pace, and include a “degree of difficulty” factor based on the level of competition a player faces while on the floor.

In PPA, average is always 100. Higher is better, and replacement level is 45. Maynor’s career PPA: 49. His PPA last season was 32. Even in Portland, where he was better, his PPA was 41. There’s some reason to think he’ll be a bit better this season, which will be his first full season back from a serious knee injury. His pre-injury PPA was 57, which is solidly above replacement level (though still a long ways from being a quality rotation player).

Maynor’s primary contributions are purported to be on the offensive end, which is a good thing since he doesn’t rebound (even for a PG), and his defense is average at best. The numbers reveal him to be inefficient offensively (a career offensive rating of 101 points per 100 possessions vs. a league average of around 105 during his career; an ortg of just 96 last season). He’s a slightly better assist man than Price, but it comes with more turnovers as well.

One argument I’ve seen is that Maynor is better than Price at running the team and getting it into proper sets. I’m willing to accept this claim with the proviso that for this “ability” to be meaningful, it would have to show up on the scoreboard — in the on/off stats. And, the data is, at best, equivocal.

For his career, Maynor’s teams have been slightly worse offensively when he’s been on the floor (to the tune of 1.3 points per 100 possessions — a small difference that could just be randomness). Going season by season suggests to me that the best conclusion to reach is that Maynor has little to no effect on his team’s offense. As a rookie, his teams (Utah and Oklahoma City) were worse offensively when he was on the floor. In his second year, OKC was a little better when he was in the game. In his brief third season (just 137 total minutes), OKC was much better +7.1 points per 100 possessions (but with so few minutes that the data is virtually meaningless).

Last season? OKC was worse offensively when he was in the game; Portland was better. In sum, his teams last season were the same whether he was in the game or out.

This is not to say the Wizards have lost anything great in Price. He posted a career-best PPA of 84 last season, and seems like an adequate reserve PG. Like Maynor, Price’s offensive on/off numbers don’t suggest an impact player. For his career, Price’s teams have been “about the same” whether he’s in the game or not (they’ve been 0.5 points per 100 possessions less efficient offensively when he’s been on the floor). Last season, the Wizards were bad offensively when Price was in the game (100.3 points per 100 possessions), and they were just as bad offensively when he was out of the game (100.2 points per 100 possessions).

At this point, I’ve been over the data several times. I don’t see anything to support the notion that Maynor is any kind of upgrade over Price. Maynor might make an extra dynamic play now and then, but it comes at the cost of more turnovers, fewer rebounds, and iffy defense.

And all of this is before even getting to the Wizards’ rush to sign Maynor on the first day of free agency, burning the biannual exception on a marginal player, and precluding themselves from using it on other (more productive) guards who signed elsewhere OR from using it to sign a reserve big man like DeJuan Blair.

As a fan of the team, I hope I’m wrong, but the only way this can be an upgrade for the Wizards is if Maynor plays significantly better in Washington than he has in his previous four seasons.

What Else Would They Be?

Mike Lee offered up this piece about Wizards President Ernie Grunfeld, Coach Randy Wittman optimistic about upcoming season. Leaving aside the “well, of course, what else would they be?” factor, there were some tidbits that are worth a little scrutiny.

Grunfeld on expectations for upcoming season: ”We’re excited about the upcoming season. We finished last year off strong. Obviously, our young players have worked hard in the offseason. They’ve shown improvement and we want to build on what we started to establish last year. Obviously, our initial goal is to be a playoff contender and ultimately, by the end of the year, make the playoffs.

Standard GM babble that doesn’t mean much of anything. The first sentence that catches my eye is that one about young players working hard in the offseason. This is a story being repeated right now in every NBA city by owners, executives, coaches, players, journalists, pundits and fans alike. It sounds and feels good, but if every team’s young players are working hard and getting better…how much advantage does one team get over another?

In reality, a large number of those stories are chicken manure. Some guys worked hard; others didn’t. Some guys used their time well and improved their games; others didn’t.

And there’s yet another thing to consider — let’s say for the sake of discussion that Kevin Seraphin, Jan Vesely and Chris Singleton all put in a ton of work this offseason and really, truly, genuinely got better. How much will it make a difference? These guys were among the league’s least productive players last season. They’re each coming from such a low level that they could make major improvements and still be bad.

Wittman on his expectations for Kevin Seraphin: “I have high expectations for all of our guys coming in. Do I have expectations for Kevin to have a better year than he did last year? Yes. … Kevin…his confidence level now, and how he holds himself now, being here pretty much all summer working on his game to make that next step. Yeah, I expect that from our young guys to continue that growth. I think we saw it with Jan. Jan had a good summer, whether it was just with us in the summer league or what he did, playing with his national team. You know, those are positive things and you hope that now they can carry that over into the season.”

The team is still prepping for training camp so they’re still peddling optimism. You’re not going to hear a coach saying something like, “Seraphin was really bad last season and we’ll have to see if he’s improved before we’ll count on him as a part of the rotation.”

It would surely be nice if Seraphin could somehow regain the form he showed at the end of the season before last. That guy was at least a competent NBA player. Last season, he was awful — the league’s least productive center, according to my analysis. Seraphin is a weird bundle of contradictions. He has a massive, muscle-bound frame (he says he currently weighs 277 and has a body fat percentage 0f 9.5%), but he rebounds like a small forward. He has a smooth looking post-up game, but those smooth-looking shots miss more often than they hit. And he’s a turnover machine.

Confidence is wonderful, but it needs to come with competence. After his terrible play last season, I’m skeptical about whether he’ll ever be a useful NBA player. By all means give him a chance in training camp to show he’s improved. But I wouldn’t count on him as part of the rotation.

Grunfeld on meeting offseason goals: “I think we had some goals of what we wanted to accomplish. We wanted to upgrade our backup point guard position and Eric [Maynor] has been with us now, three weeks in a row. He’s very solid, very steady. He brings a little poise to the game. He knows how to play. So we feel we’ve upgraded that position. We wanted to get a stretch four and Al [Harrington] will provide that for us. And we also wanted to make sure our young players continue to develop. Our young players, like Seraphin and Vesely, as Randy just spoke about, and Bradley Beal. I think one of the things that Brad also did was improve his ball handling, and try to play better in the pick and roll. He worked on his body and is outstanding shape. As all of our young players are. So, we wanted to see improvement from within and we wanted also address some of the positional needs that we felt like we had and I think we have. And I feel like the continuity of having 11 players back from last year’s roster will also help us.”

Here, Grunfeld is making the same assertion I’ve been seeing all summer — the Wizards have upgraded at backup PG by signing Eric Maynor. Maybe Grunfeld and “everyone” will turn out to be correct, but I don’t think so. My analysis reveals Maynor as unproductive throughout his career — both before and after his knee injury.

Last season, A.J. Price was better. Per 36 minutes, Maynor generated exactly one assist more than Price. But, Price shot better from the floor and the free throw line, got nearly twice as many rebounds, and had 1.2 fewer turnovers per 36 minutes.

For what (in my analysis) is actually a DOWNgrade at backup PG, the Wizards spent their biannual exception. On the first of day of free agency. Which meant that they didn’t have the BAE to spend later when they could have signed other reserve PGs who would have been upgrades over Price, or when they could have signed a reserve big man like DeJuan Blair. But, hey, who needs depth in the frontcourt when you have Seraphin and Jan Vesely?

Wittman on maintaining continuity: “We’re going, as a coaching staff, the last two or three weeks, evaluating how we want to conduct camp, and it’s so much easier when you’ve got … 11 that understand why we’re doing things, how we’re going to do things. That makes it a lot easier in my mind, in terms of evaluating how much you throw at them and how they handle it and all that. So that’s a positive. We established ourselves from a standpoint defensively, and that’s not going to change. That’s got to be first and foremost as we head into camp, that foundation that we built and that they built. They bought into this system and that system won’t change. They know what that system is already compared to last year with as many new faces as we had, that you had to teach that new system. That’s always a positive.”

The team has been selling “continuity” as part of its plan since they made the trade to get Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza. As I’ve written in other places, I think they have the “let’s keep everyone together” part too early in their plan. Continuity is outcome, not a goal. When a team starts winning, it makes sense to keep it together. When a team loses, it’s nuts to say, “We’ll start winning if we keep these guys together.”

No, teams are bad because the players are unproductive. The GM of a bad team shouldn’t be thinking about continuity, he should be thinking about how he get rid of dead weight on his roster and bringing in better players.

Then of course there’s consideration given to what the team’s goals are. In this case, their goal is to compete for a playoff spot. When you’re 178 games under .500 over the past decade (by some weird coincidence, the number of years Grunfeld has been at the helm), I guess that qualifies as a stretch goal. And, they have a realistic goal of achieving it, especially if Okafor’s neck heals. Still, it might have been wise to get another big man (not a SF masquerading as a PF like Al Harrington) in case something happened to one of the team’s 30+ year old bigs.

Speaking of Harrington — while it made Wall (and some fans) happy to sign an officially designated “stretch four” (a power forward who shoots jump shots and doesn’t rebound much), Harrington’s biggest contribution will be to keep Vesely, Singleton and (possibly) Seraphin off the floor. Each of that group landed among the league’s 15 least productive players last season, and it’ll be a net gain if some combination of Harrington and Trevor Booker can consume some of the 3,246 minutes they played last season.

Think about that a sec. Three of the 15 least productive players in the game last season were on the floor for 16.3% of the team’s minutes. Wow.

So, Harrington can help just by playing reasonably competent basketball (which he’s done in the past) and keeping those three on the bench. That said, I continue to think that the team’s best stretch four is Trevor Ariza — a tough-as-nails competitor who can shoot the three.

The Leonsis Interview with Mike Wise: Some Thoughts In Response

Washington Post columnist Mike Wise sat down with Wizards owner Ted Leonsis for a 45-minute interview. The transcript is here, and I recommend reading the whole thing. I’m going to pull out a few of Ted’s comments that I think are worth commentary and/or analysis.

First, though — kudos to Ted for doing the interview at all. I disagree with much of what he says, but I appreciate his openness and willingness to face reporter questions. It’s more than a lot of owners do.

Leonsis: Wall, Crawford and Beal, that’s a pretty good three-guard rotation. We want to bring in a seasoned backup point guard. … And so what our belief is, we’re hoping John Wall and Beal become real stars that we keep and kind of build around them. Can Wall and Beal and Crawford one day be Isiah, Dumars and the Microwave? Right, I mean, that would be a pretty good backcourt.

I wish Ted had included “potentially” in this comment because it’s not a good three-guard rotation. And yeah, Isiah, Dumars and Vinny Johnson did make a good backcourt. But let’s be real: none of the Wizards “trio” have proven to be “good” NBA players. Wall has been average. His “glory stats” (per game points, rebounds and assists) look pretty good, but his shooting has been atrocious and his overall efficiency (including turnovers) has been awful.

Crawford is bad — one of the least efficient high usage players in league history. Since the NBA implemented the 3pt shot in 1979-80 there have been 930 player seasons in which a player received at least 1500 total minutes and had a usage rate of 25% or higher. Crawford ranks 907th in individual offensive rating (individual points produced per 100 individual possessions).

During that span, there have been 851 player seasons with an individual offensive rating at least 3 points per 100 possessions better than Crawford. If we limit the look to players in their first two seasons, there have been 121 player seasons fitting the criteria above. Crawford ranks 108th on that list. Virtually anyone in the NBA could score as many points as Crawford did last season if he shot as frequently.

Beal, of course, has played zero minutes in the NBA. I predict that he’ll be a good player. In my draft analysis, Beal’s score in YODA was similar to freshman SGs like Michael Jordan, Clyde Drexler and Vince Carter. So there’s hope.

Leonsis: That’s why I looked at are we better at using our money in space to get Okafor and Ariza, then hoping and praying that we can get a free agent that believes and wants to come here. Then you hope while making a free-agent deal, those deals are pretty high-priced. Two years.

I understand what Ted’s hoping to do by using the cap space on Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza, but I think it’s a bad strategy. As I wrote a few days ago, they would have been smarter to buy out Rashard Lewis and amnesty Blatche, and then used the resulting cap space to outbid Dallas for Elton Brand (amnestied by Philly and picked up by the Mavericks for $2.1 million), outbid San Antonio for Danny Green (hugely underrated and re-signed for $4 million per season — an absolute bargain), and outbid Atlanta for Lou Williams (an efficient, 3rd guard type who signed for the mid-level exception). And they still could have had $8-9 million in cap room next offseason.

What the Wizards have done is buy a couple years of mediocrity at best. And at the end of those two years, they won’t be in position to pursue free agents because they’ll need to re-sign John Wall (they hope) and they’ll have other contracts coming due for extensions and renewals. This was their shot to use their cap space to add young players who fit their rebuild — they spent it on Okafor and Ariza.

Leonsis: We’ve made big investments in the analytic side and the technology side. … Besides our in-house guys, we have one cool guy: Joe Sill. Joe presents on occasion at that stats thing at MIT. Double-math PHd. He’s almost like a technical trader on Wall St. I can pick a company you should invest in. He’ll never meet the CEO, but he knows from the numbers which ones to pick. …

I do think there is a big, big role in informing some decisions. Also, that the little things have value. Our defensive rebounding — and the defensive rebounding stats of our guards — improved dramatically when Nene came and JaVale left. So, getting guards who can rebound becomes important. If your forwards are pushing their men out, that’s not a stat. That’s something you follow. That means the guards have the opportunity to get the rebounds and initiate their own break. Teaching rebounding becomes important. So Beal is a real good rebounder as a guard who fits really good with what we’re trying to do.

I’m a stat guy, so I like that they’re investing in analytics. Joe Sill is a “regularized adjusted plus minus” guy, and definitely a smart guy. The “promise” of RAPM is that it’s results are more accurate than straight (APM) because of something called “ridge regression,” which reduces standard errors. RAPM and APM are numbers I pay attention to, but I’m dubious about their utility because I’m not persuaded that the proponents fully understand all the factors that go into the “adjustment.”

Leonsis:

We’re also one of the few teams have installed this super heat-seeking missile cameras. Have you heard about this? We have these HD cameras. Another Stanford kid does it for us. This thing creates real-time heat maps. Literally you can get down to the pixels on the floor. Where are the shots being taken, where are the shots being made, where are the picks being made. It does interesting things like, how many dribbles on a fast break does your guard hold the ball before he dishes off, and was their a good shot made versus other guards in the league.

How does this work in practice: You tell a guard you were negating your speed by dribbling two more times. And then, when you dribble only three times and then you dish, we convert 70 percent of the time. All of this data then gets used in practice, like, in coaching sessions.”

I’ll tell you a lesson I learned 10 years ago with Ron Wilson and Adam Oates. I’ll never forget this. Adam Oates was the [quarterback] of our power play. Adam didn’t even know he was doing it, but he would put his skate up against the wall and bring that skate down and then get that pass. When the [power play] became not productive, he stopped doing that, and he was collecting the puck just a little further away, seven or eight inches away, from the half board.

The entire geometry of the ice changed, six or seven inches. Rob Wilson showed him, I remember, and said, ‘Just do that: Put your skate against the board.’ The power play came back. So that to me, as an owner, was the first indication that a little thing reviewed, fixed, coached can have unbelievable, big positive impact.

So we wanted to use as many tools as we can to try to give us advantage, and bringing in some of these coaches from winning programs. Bringing in these analytics, bringing in high IQ, good people it’s all a part of trying to change a losing culture to a winning culture.

This sounds really cool, and I’d love to analyze the take. The information is ultimately going to be as good as the analyst, and hopefully the team has good ones in place.

Interesting exchange between Wise and Ted about Blatche:

Q. I was reading quotes from two years ago about how much you thought signing Blatche to an extension was a great idea. Two years later, does this qualify as your biggest disappointment of owning the Wizards’ thus far?

A. Yes — we made a mistake — although the NBA has had close to $250 million of amnestied players to date — sometimes you get a chance to take a mulligan under the new rules and that is what we did.

Q. Who bears the most responsibility for the fact that he didn’t work out in Washington?

A. We are all in it together — so we are all to blame. Buck has to stop with me though as owner. I appreciate Andray’s apology to the fans and I hope he is able to turn around his career.

Q. Given your belief in redemption, was it particularly hard to cut him loose?

A. No, it wasnt. It was in best interest of franchise.

Ultimately, the person who bears responsibility for Blatche’s failure in Washington is Blatche himself. Had he worked hard, played hard and had a better attitude, he’d still be with the team and he’d be productive. He had ability. He just never put in what was necessary to come close to maximizing it.

On the (to me) difficult to understand decision to give Ernie Grunfeld another two years running the Wizards:

Leonsis: With Ernie what I found was, could we be on the same wavelength? Would he build team with eight or nine first-round picks? Could he make trades? I thought trading Gilbert was impossible. I thought trading Rashard was impossible.

It’s hard to even unpack what I think are faulty assumptions by Ted. Any player can be traded if you’re willing to pay the other guy’s price. They could trade Arenas because they took back a contract almost as bad. They were able to trade Lewis because they could solve all of New Orleans long-term salary cap issues with a single trade. And somehow, Grunfeld also gave up a 2nd round pick to make it happen. And New Orleans then used the cap room they acquired from the Wizards to trade for a 23-year old PF who happens to be supremely underrated.

I like several of the guys working for Grunfeld, but I have little belief that Grunfeld will build a title-contending team in Washington. The moves they made this offseason seem designed to get the Wizards in contention for the playoffs for the next two years. That is, contention for the 7th or 8th seed, not for a division title and a top 3-4 seed. To me, it’s a disappointment to see the team go for a sacrifice bunt when they had an opportunity to swing for the fences.

That said, I hope I’m wrong.

More Reasons to Not Like the Wizards Trade for Okafor and Ariza

New Orleans acquired Ryan Anderson with the cap space they acquired from the Wizards.

A week before the NBA draft, the Washington Wizards traded the expiring contract of Rashard Lewis and a 2nd round pick to New Orleans for Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza. Over at the Wizards board on RealGM, I went on record as strongly disliking the trade.

The argument in favor of the trade was that it provided some certainty. The Wizards could be assured of having a couple solid players on the roster without worrying about the mercurial nature of NBA free agency.

My objection: it dealt away ALL the team’s cap room for at least the next two years in exchange for a couple guys who will help the Wizards contend for the 7th or 8th playoff spot for the next couple seasons — not compete for a championship within the next 3-5 years. In effect, the Wizards won’t have cap room for the foreseeable future because of pending contract renewals that will come due.

The counter to my objection has generally been to talk about the difficulty Washington would have recruiting free agents. But, there are more ways to use cap room than merely signing free agents, and preserving the flexibility to pursue some of those “ways” would have been preferable to the trade they made.

And the events of this offseason demonstrate that.

While some NBA teams have been overpaying players, others have been snapping up relative bargains. Dallas, for example, claimed Elton Brand in the amnesty waiver draft for just $2.1 million. His production last year was worth $9.4 million, according to my salary formula.

Brand’s teammate Lou Williams — a combo guard who scores efficiently — signed a mid-level deal starting at $5 million. His production last year was worth $8.8 million.

The Spurs re-signed the criminally underrated Danny Green for three years and $12 million total ($4 million per season) — Green’s production last season was worth more than $7 million.

Phoenix recently amnestied Josh Childress, a SF who has disappointed in the desert. And, while Childress hasn’t been worth his contract, he’d be an asset to a team as an off-the-bench swingman for 25-30% of his deal.

Had the Wizards bit the financial bullet and bought out Lewis for $13.7 million, and followed that up by amnestying Blatche, they would have had sufficient cap space to outbid Dallas for Brand, outbid Atlanta for Williams, and outbid San Antonio for Green. Then they could have used minimum salary deals to bring in depth players.

Or, they might have been able to use the cap space they traded to New Orleans to do what the Hornets did — acquire 23-year old PF Ryan Anderson in a sign and trade with the Magic.

Amnesty Blatche Now

I don’t want even go into the rabbit hole of why the recent trade of Rashard Lewis and the 46th pick in the draft for Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza was bad for the Wizards. I’ve hammered away on that front on the RealGM board and I’ve said what I want to say on that subject.

Today I’m writing because of this tidbit in Mike Lee’s “Insider” blog at the Washington Post:

The Wizards could potentially create more spending money by using the amnesty provision – a one-time clause that allows teams to waive a player and have his contract removed from the salary cap – on Andray Blatche. They have until July 17 to make a decision on Blatche, who has three years and $23 million left on his contract. Grunfeld said Blatche is currently training with former Maryland star, NBA player and coach John Lucas in Houston.

“He’s under contract with us,” he said. “He’s out working out with John Lucas right now. Working hard. Trying to get back into shape and doing the kind of things that he needs to do.”

I understand that the Wizards want to get something from their investment in Blatche. He still has three years and $23.4 million remaining on his contract. And it’s sorta possible the Wiz could get “something” from Blatche if he can just…fix his body and mind. But, the juice just ain’t worth the squeezing. Even when Blatche was “good”, he wasn’t. Even during his best stretch of play for the team, he still was inefficient offensively and lacklust on defense and on the glass.

The environment around the team improved significantly when they separated him from the team. They should make that situation permanent.

The team’s apparent attempt to bring him back for yet another chance makes no sense to me. He doesn’t just need to “get in shape.” He needs more than to drop a few pounds, he needs a radical reworking of his body. He needs things like strength, burst, agility, leaping ability — things he should have been developing during his seven NBA seasons. Blatche needs remedial work physically, and improving his play is dependent on him DOING that work consistently over a period of time. Which, of course, is something he’s showed no inclination of ever doing. But this time will be different, right?

Then factor in that the physical side of things is the easy part of getting something useful out of him. The way he thinks the game, his on-court decision-making — it’s facacta. He has to learn that a shot isn’t good because he’s decided it’s time for him to fling the ball at the hoop. He needs to learn how to rebound; how to move his feet on defense; how to use his length on defense; how to set screens, make smart passes, move without the ball, find open spaces, cut to the basket hard, and more. He needs to learn how to run the floor hard to both offense and defense. He needs mental toughness to get through mistakes and bad stretches instead of wincing and grimacing and suddenly coming down with some pain to explain why he just f-ed up. He needs to stop blaming his coach and teammates when something goes wrong and start owning the fact that he’s pissing away what could have been a terrific NBA career.

In other words, he still needs to learn how to actually play basketball in a way that might help his team win.

Yet the Wizards hold out hope they can rehab him and get something useful for him. And maybe they will. All it’ll take is a transformation of his body, mind and personality. Hey, at least they have a full offseason. Hope they packed a Snickers. Doh, not a Snickers for Blatche. How about an apple?

2012 NBA Draft Position Rankings from YODA

Earlier today, I posted overall rankings for the 2012 NBA Draft using my draft analysis system, which has been dubbed YODA. Here’s the same information, but this time by position. In this post, I’m adding in a standardized score to show the differences between players.

The best score in YODA history was Shaquille O’Neal’s sophomore year at LSU. In the standardized score I’m showing, Shaq’s season scored a 36. Everyone else scales below that. Zero means the player rates as an average prospect.

Here are all players with a draftable score in YODA:

Point Guards

Damian Lillard — 7
Kendall Marshall — 4
Tony Wroten — 0
Reggie Hamilton — 0
Jordan Taylor — 0
Casper Ware — -1
Scott Machado — -1
Lazeric Jones — -3
Marquis Teague — -3
Scoop Jardine — -3
Tyshawn Taylor — -4

Shooting Guard

Marcus Denmon — 12
Bradley Beal — 8
Will Barton — 5
Dion Waiters — 5
Darius Johnson-Odom — 2
Jeremy Lamb — 2
John Jenkins — 1
Orlando Johnson — 1
Devoe Joseph — 0
Doron Lamb — -2
J.R. Cadot — -2
Kim English — -3
Matt Gatens — -3
Tanner Smith — -3
Jared Cunningham — -4

Small Forward

Jae Crowder — 16
Michael Kidd-Gilchrist — 8
Harrison Barnes — 3
Jeff Taylor — 1
Quincy Miller — 0
John Shurna — 0
Ken Horton — -1
Moe Harkless — -1
Chris Johnson — -2
Darius Miller — -3
Robbie Hummel — -3
Chace Stanback — -3
Wendell McKines — -4
Alex Young — -4
Terrence Ross — -5

Power Forward

Anthony Davis — 28
Draymond Green — 7
Thomas Robinson — 6
Jared Sullinger — 3
Terrence Jones — 3
Ricardo Ratliffe — 2
John Henson — 0
Kevin Jones — 0
Drew Gordon — 0
Quincy Acy — -1
Trevor Mbakwe — -1
Perry Jones III — -2
Arnett Moultrie — -2
Mike Scott — -3
JaMychal Green — -3
Bernard James — -3
Jack Cooley — -3

Center

Tyler Zeller — 15
Miles Plumlee — 3
Andre Drummond — 3
Meyers Leonard — -1
Garrett Stutz — -3
Fab Melo — -3

The Draft According to YODA

Over the past couple months, I’ve been posting regularly in the draft threads on the Wizards board at RealGM about my research into evaluating NCAA draft prospects. The project is an effort to use college stats, as well as measurements, times and scores from draft combines to project which players are most likely to become good professionals.

The system I’ve come up with involves using per minute stats, includes an accounting for level of competition, and adjusts for age — a great performance from an 18-year old freshman is more impressive than the same performance from a 23-year old senior.

After referring to “the system” several times on the boards as Ye Olde Draft Analyzer, someone dubbed it YODA and the name stuck. The results? Time will tell on this year’s draft class. In previous years, YODA’s predictions have been good, but that’s the subject for a later post at some point in the future.

Below are the players as they’re rated by YODA. I’ve divided them into “tiers” — basically groupings of players by quality. The separation between Tier One and Tier Two is significant; the differences between players in the same tier are insignificant.

Here’s how I think about the tier system. Teams generally give themselves a better chance of succeeding when they pick best player available rather than focusing on specific roster needs. This should limit “reaches.” Plus, getting the best player gives the team another asset for trade purposes. Of course, it’s not always clear who the “best player” actually is.

That’s where the tiers enter the picture. Players who are “about the same” fall into the same tier. When a team’s pick comes around, they can use this process to pick whichever player on the same tier best fits their needs. They should avoid “reaching” into a lower tier to pick for need.

Anyway — the prospects according to YODA (along with sample players through the years who rated on the same tier):

NOTE: The tiers are numbered for this year only. They’re not historical tiers — that’s a work still in progress.

Tier One

Historical: Kevin Durant, Greg Oden

Anthony Davis, PF, Kentucky — Davis posted the most impressive freshman season I’ve analyzed. He’s the second rated prospect in YODA behind Shaquille O’Neal’s sophomore season. Similar YODA scores: Kevin Durant and Greg Oden.

Tier Two

Historical: Allen Iverson (SO), Zach Randolph (FR), Carmelo Anthony (FR)

Jae Crowder, SF, Marquette
Tyler Zeller, C, North Carolina

Tier Three

Historical: Jason Kidd (FR), Josh Howard (SR), Tim Duncan (JR)

Marcus Denmon, SG, Missouri

Tier Four

Historical: Paul Pierce (JR), Tony Allen (SO), Gilbert Arenas (FR), Ty Lawson (FR)

Bradley Beal, SG, Florida
Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, SF, Kentucky

Tier Five

Historical: Caron Butler (SO), Brandon Roy (JR), Rudy Gay (FR), Mike Miller (SO)

Damian Lillard, PG, Weber State
Draymond Green, PF, Michigan State
Thomas Robinson, PF, Kansas
Will Barton, SG, Memphis
Dion Waiters, SG, Syracuse

Tier Six

Historical: Ryan Anderson (SO), Ben Gordon (JR), Roy Hibbert (SR), Karl Malone (FR)

Kendall Marshall, PG, North Carolina
Jared Sullinger, PF, Ohio State
Miles Plumlee, F/C, Duke
Harrison Barnes, SF, North Carolina
Terrence Jones, F, Kentucky
Andre Drummond, C, Connecticut

Tier Seven

Historical: Antawn Jamison (SO), Deron Williams (SO), Jordan Crawford (SO)

Darius Johnson-Odom, SG, Marquette
Jeremy Lamb, SG, Connecticut
Ricardo Ratliffe, PF, Missouri

Tier Eight

Historical: Chris Singleton (JR), Jarrett Jack (SO), Harold Miner (FR), Charlie Villanueva (SO)

Jeff Taylor, SF, Vanderbilt
John Jenkins, SG, Vanderbilt
Orlando Johnson, SG, UCSB
Tony Wroten, PG, Washington
Quincy Miller, SF, Baylor

Tier Nine

Historical: Jared Dudley (JR), Gerald Wallace (FR), Hakim Warrick (FR), Lester Hudson (JR), Morris Almond (SR), Michael Redd (SO)

John Henson, PF, North Carolina
Reggie Hamilton, PG, Oakland
Kevin Jones, PF, West Virginia
Jordan Taylor, PG, Wisconsin
John Shurna, F, Northwestern
Devoe Joseph, SG, Oregon
Drew Gordon, PF, New Mexico

That’s enough to get through the first round. Tier 9 players are average prospects historically, according to YODA. In the “historical” sections, I’ve included a few representative players. It’s worth nothing that good pros have come from many “tiers,” which is demonstration of the reality that a) evaluating prospects is an inexact science; and b) that MANY young players have the capability to be quality professional players if they work hard enough and smart enough. The reality is that EVERY player arriving in the NBA needs to improve. The difference between a kid who becomes an All-Star and a kid who’s out of the league in three years is very much about the amount of purposeful, deliberate, well-considered work each player puts into developing his game and his body.

Pumping the Brakes On Javale McGee

As I wander the vast tundra of the Internet, I keep stumbling across Wizards fans excited about the play of Javale McGee. The general sentiment among the die hard is this: McGee has improved and he’s still young. The action they want: The Wizards need to lock him up now rather than risk seeing him leave in free agency.

Evidence to support the “he’s improved” claim usually includes:

an expanded offensive repertoire — specifically the hook and the post-up series
better rebounding, and
leading the league in blocked shots.

I am not here to terminate all talk of a McGee extension. He has otherworldly physical ability, and I’ve seen signs of development when I watch the games. I think he’s getting better.

But, there’s enough evidence to suggest that pumping the brakes on contract talks would be a wise course of action for the Wizards.

Here’s why.

While he is doing more offensively, he’s never been less efficient at the offensive end. His offensive rating (points produced per 100 individual possessions) stands at 98 — one of the better marks on the team, but well below the league average (about 102.6). Part of this is turnovers (the highest turnover rate of his career), but the bigger part is awful free throw shooting (45.7% from the line so far this season).

The free throw shooting is cause for concern because both his percentage and his per minute free throw attempts have dropped every season of his career so far.

While his overall percentage from the floor is adequate thus far, the numbers at Hoopdata show that he still hasn’t developed an effective shot at any range beyond point-blank. This season, McGee is shooting 68% at the rim — but from 3 feet or more, just 31.7%. At that conversion rate, there’s no reason for him to take a shot unless he’s at the rim.

So, that’s offense. On the defensive end, folks have been getting excited about the blocked shots. And they are spectacular. The problem: in his zeal to block shots, McGee too often fails to make basic plays that good centers manage routinely. For example, on dribble penetration McGee often crouches in the background and attempts to spring out to get the block. The right play — the one Tim Duncan makes — is to step over quickly and impede the penetrator’s path to the basket. Force a tough shot or a pass and let the blocked shot come as a result of presence and positioning, not just athleticism.

In addition, McGee’s lust for blocks leads to excessive goaltending calls. McGee has 8 so far this season — about 1 goaltend for every 5 blocks. Next on the list is Dwight Howard with 5 — about 1 goaltend for 9 blocks.

And, the possession-by-possession data compiled by Synergy rates McGee as the team’s WORST man defender — despite all the blocked shots.

Finally, the on/off data is worrisome. Despite McGee’s much-ballyhooed improvement, the team has been far worse when he’s been on the floor. The data at Basketball Value shows the team being outscored by 20 points per 100 possessions when McGee is on the floor vs. being outscored by 3.5 points when he’s on the bench. That’s a whopping 16.5-point differential.

When McGee has been on the floor, the on/off data suggests the team has been much worse at both ends of the court.

Are these signs definitive? No, of course not. It’s still early in the season, and I’d expect those on/off numbers to moderate as more games are recorded. Maybe he’s just on a cold streak from the free throw line. Maybe he’ll start “getting it” on defense. Maybe the offensive efficiency and shooting percentage will climb as he continues implementing his still-developing offensive repertoire.

But, maybe he’s a human highlight reel that just won’t make enough of the “routine” plays to anchor a winning team. Maybe he’s the definition of “empty stats” — a guy who posts some gaudy numbers that get attention, but always for a loser.

My point here is not to say McGee will or won’t “get it”. My point is that there’s evidence to suggest he hasn’t “gotten it” yet. So, there’s no reason to rush into a contract extension with him. The Wizards have plenty of cap and roster space, plus the right to match any contract offer he receives. The smart move is to wait, watch and evaluate. There’s little to gain — and potentially much to lose — by making a decision now.

Watching the Wizards Is Apparently A Fate Worse Than Death

Rafe Bartholomew writing for Grantland has this piece up about forcing himself to sit through the Wizards only win of the season. Why would an otherwise sane person (meaning not a fan of either the Wizards or the Raptors) subject themselves to watching this game?

Wrote Bartholomew:

It’s not because we want to mock bad teams and their fan bases. It’s about sharing the pain and finding slivers of joy in otherwise ugly basketball.

Bartholomew captures the stunning ineptitude and depression that sets in when watching the Wizards play. Even a win can’t be enjoyed for long because of nagging worries that the team might somehow win just enough to screw up its chances of getting a difference-making player in the draft.

Some Bartholomew gems:

Washington rookie Chris Singleton made a move to the elbow, picked up his dribble, and got stuck. First, he looked to shoot, but he reconsidered when it became clear that the only way to get the shot off would be to launch a turnaround fadeaway. Unfortunately, while Singleton held the ball and looked for an open teammate, none of the other four Wizards on the floor moved to get open. Maybe they were thinking, Take the shot! That’s what I’d do! It was only their ninth game of the season, but the Wizards seemed to have already internalized the lesson that once a teammate started attacking the basket, moving without the ball was not worth the effort. Singleton eventually passed to Wall, who had about two seconds left on the shot clock to launch a contested 3. The ball bounced off the top of the backboard, followed by a close-up of Flip Saunders’ aneurysm face.

And

In the second quarter, Raptors analyst Jack Armstrong went in on Blatche. It started late in the first, actually, when Blatche threw the ball to Nick Young. “He passed the ball,” Armstrong said. “Wow.” I don’t think I’d ever made myself watch a full Blatche game before Tuesday night. If you’re like me, you probably wondered if all the things people wrote about his shot selection and near-total refusal to pass were exaggerated. Well, they weren’t. Within minutes, I had scribbled “Blatche hole?” in my notebook, and not once in the game did I feel the need to revise or amend that description.

And

At the beginning of the third quarter, the Wizards led 46-34, DeRozan was shooting 10 percent from the field, and Wall wasn’t doing much better. I started stress eating a two-pack of YoGo Tuxedo Cakes I bought at Walgreen’s before the game. My notes became vague and occasionally illegible. The second half was a blur of Toronto turnovers — some created by Washington’s length and activity — and easy transition baskets for the Wizards.

And

I calculated the number of calories in one Tuxedo Cake — 340, in a three-ounce pastry — and vowed not to eat more than one. It took a JaVale McGee moment to rouse me from my corn syrup-and-Raptors-induced torpor. On offense, McGee — who is nothing if not adventurous — attempted to slash in from the wing and swing the ball past a reaching help defender. There aren’t a lot of NBA centers who can pull off a move like this, and although McGee is extremely agile and quick for his size, he still isn’t one of them. But he comes close, and McGee seems to gain some satisfaction from almost executing euro-steps and dunks from the free throw line, even though his near-misses typically cost his team buckets at the other end. So after a Raptors defender stripped McGee of the ball and passed it ahead to start the break, McGee didn’t give up on the play. He had coughed up the ball, and he decided to get it back. McGee dashed after Rasual Butler and caught him just in time to goaltend a layup attempt after Butler drew a foul, giving Butler an unearned opportunity for a 3-point play.

And

Over the years, several players have been called “coach killers” for feuding with and eventually getting their coaches fired. McGee, with his talent, his boundless but frequently wanton enthusiasm, and his apparent disconnect with reality, may literally kill a coach someday by attempting some foolish play at the worst possible moment that leads to a sideline stroke or heart attack.

Yes — this is what it’s like to be a Wizards fan these days.

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