Responding to Ted Leonsis “Wizards Add Talented Big Man” Post

Wizards owner Ted Leonsis weighed in at his blog with his thoughts on the team’s acquisition of center Marcin Gortat. As usual, I’m not sure whether Leonsis actually believes what he’s saying, or if he’s merely careless with words, or if he’s applying PR spin, or if he’s being cynical. Either way, I thought some of what he wrote was worth a response:

Leonsis opened his blog posting with this:

The Wizards made a trade to add a talented big man to our roster Friday night — and Marcin Gortat will contribute right away to our team. It was important to our franchise to enter this season at full strength and to have depth and show upside and improvement.

Lots here. Yep, Gortat is talented, and he will contribute immediately. Part of that is because the other guys on the roster at power forward and center are so awful. More on that in a moment.

That second sentence is one of those that make me wonder if he’s being careless with words or whether he’s really that cynical about fans of his team. In sports-speak, “upside” means potential and “depth” means having more than one good player at a position.

Maybe I’m just THAT stupid, but I can’t figure out how trading for a 29-year old center on a one-year contract can count as “upside.” If Gortat does his job, the team will likely get to the playoffs, which won’t mean much unless they re-sign him, which they really don’t want to do because of Leonsis’ previous chest-thumping about signing a “brand name” free agent.

His “depth” comment is a face palm moment. Why wasn’t frontcourt depth important to “show” during the summer? With a solid small forward on the roster for another year (Trevor Ariza) and two more swingmen joining the team through the draft (Otto Porter and Glen Rice Jr.), why spend the mid-level exception on yet another SF (Martell Webster)? With an acceptable backup point guard easily re-signed for the league minimum (A.J. Price), why rush out the first day of free agency and burn the bi-annual exception on a scrub (Eric Maynor)?

As for that “improvement” thing — it’s kinda hard to know what he means. Does he mean the team’s record? If so, then I’d sort of agree. The team should win more games this season. It could be an illusory improvement, however because Gortat and Ariza are on expiring contracts and could depart whether the Wizards want to re-sign them or not. Plus, as mentioned above, Leonsis is hoping to attract a free agent — something that can’t happen if the team re-signs Gortat and/or Ariza.

Moving on:

We traded a protected first round pick to get the deal done. We have many young players on our team today and we believed that  using our conditional pick to get the deal done was the prudent  move for our franchise at this time in its development. Of our 15 players under contract 8 players have been drafted by us in the first or second round in the last 4 off seasons. We are a very young team still.

We have noted that we would use the draft, first and foremost, to rebuild our team. 8 players and make trades to bring on vets such as Trevor Ariza, Nene, and now Gortat — or free agency such as Martell Webster, Eric Maynor and Al Harrington. We dipped into the D league for Garrett Temple.

This kind of claptrap has me leaning more toward the conclusion that Leonsis is being cynical. Leonsis is suggesting that the team is actually building through the draft and that they’re just bringing in a few veterans here and there to kinda supplement these wonderful young players, who dangit arejust too young to carry the burden themselves.

But let’s go through who these eight draftees he’s talking about:

  1. John Wall — Consensus number one overall pick. Woefully inefficient on offense throughout his career (terrible shooting and lots of turnovers). Had a month last season where he played like a potential league MVP candidate. While he received a maximum salary contract extension, Wall has been more potential than production through his first three seasons.
  2. Bradley Beal — Third overall pick last season. Struggled at first, but played at a borderline All-Star level for a stretch until he had to sit due to a leg injury. His rookie season statistically looked a lot like Ray Allen’s.
  3. Otto Porter — This year’s third overall pick has been injured. In my pre-draft analysis machine “YODA,” Porter rated as a top five pick in most drafts. When he was selected, Cody Zeller and Nerlens Noel rated as better prospects. Porter should be a good pro, however.
  4. Glen Rice Jr. — The team trade two second round picks for the second round pick they used on Rice. His amateur/minor league career has been…interesting. He rated poorly as a draft prospect in college, but played well in the D-League last season. If he’d done in the NCAA what he did in the D-League, he’d have rated as a mid-first round pick. Assuming his off-court baggage is abandoned, he could make for a solid reserve SG/SF.
  5. Trevor Booker — The team made a draft-day trade to acquire him three years ago. The big issue with Booker: health. He’s been solidly productive when he’s played, but he’s missed substantial time due to a series of injuries.
  6. Kevin Seraphin — Obtained in a 2010 draft-day trade, Seraphin’s awful play was a big reason why the team had to trade a future first round pick to get a good player at center when Okafor got hurt. Last season, he was the league’s least productive center (minimum 500 minutes).
  7. Jan Vesely — Chosen sixth overall, Vesely has been an abject disaster. While Vesely has been awful, others chosen later (like Kawhi Leonard, Nikola Vucevic and Kenneth Faried) have thrived. In my analyis, Vesely last season rated as the league’s least productive power foward (minimum 500 minutes).
  8. Chris Singleton — Chosen 18th in the same draft that brought the Wizards Vesely, the team’s braintrust picked Singleton over Faried, Reggie Jackson, Jimmy Butler and Chandler Parsons. This was not a good decision. Singleton has been almost as bad as Vesely. Last season, he rated as the league’s second least productive power forward (ahead of only Vesely).

So, to recap, these young building blocks include a potentially good PG, a potentially good SG, a potentially good SF, a probable rotation swingman, a decent rotation PF, and three of the worst basketball players in the league. And oh yeah, Booker and Seraphin are on expiring contracts, and the team just declined to pick up the fourth year options on Vesely and Singleton. In other words, half of these eight draft picks that make this team so young, will be gone after the season. In effect, the team already released Vesely and Singleton. And, any money they spend re-signing Booker or Seraphin would cut into their salary cap space, which would hinder their pursuit of a “brand name” free agent.

Here are some additional clips regarding the trade.Check them out here,here,here, and here.

Shocking that he didn’t include my analysis.

Gortat Trade Is Culmination of Series of Bad Moves for Wizards

Late Friday afternoon, news emerged that the Washington Wizards had traded injured center Emeka Okafor and a first round pick to the Phoenix Suns for center Marcin Gortat and salary cap ballast. While Gortat is a good player who will help the Wizards more games than they would have with Okafor sidelined, it’s a terrible move for a rebuilding franchise.

Unfortunately for fans who had hoped to see Ted Leonsis and Ernie Grunfeld construct a team that could contend for championships in the near future, it’s merely another example of the team squandering opportunities and mismanaging its assets. In the summer of 2012, for example, the Wizards could have amnestied Andray Blatche and released Rashard Lewis — moves that would have carved out enough cap space to acquire a quality front court player, sign good young players to mid-priced contracts, AND preserved future cap space for possible future free agents.

Instead, they traded for Okafor and Trevor Ariza — both of whom figured to be two-year rentals, at best. While the rebuilding Wizards added a 30-year old Okafor to pair up front with the 31-year old Nene, rebuilding New Orleans used the cap space they’d obtained from the Wizards to acquire Ryan Anderson — a productive 24-year old power forward.

This offseason was even worse. After last season, the team’s biggest need was obvious: front court depth. Okafor and Nene were reasonably effective, but both were 30-plus years old — an age at which NBA players typically see declines in productivity and increases in time missed due to injury.

So, they went into the offseason stocked with these assets:

  • Promising starters in the backcourt (John Wall and Bradley Beal)
  • A solid SF in the final year of his contract (Ariza)
  • The third overall pick in the draft
  • Two second round picks
  • The Bi-Annual Exception (BAE)
  • The Mid-Level Exception (MLE)

They used that draft pick on SF Otto Porter, who should be a good professional player once he’s healthy. In my pre-draft analysis, I had Porter rated in a tie for fourth overall, so picking him third wasn’t much of a stretch. And, the difference between Porter and at least two of the guys I had ahead of him (Cody Zeller and Nerlens Noel) was small enough that reasonable minds could differ on which of the three projected to be the best pro.

They swapped their 2nd round picks to move up a spot and take Glen Rice Jr., which might work out as a decent move. My analysis of his D-League performance suggests Rice may have been worth a mid-first round selection — he could turn out to be a terrific value as a 2nd rounder.

But here’s where things got puzzling. On the first day of free agency, they spent their BAE to sign reserve PG Eric Maynor — a consistently crummy NBA player. Guys who performed like Maynor are ones teams invite to training camp on non-guaranteed minimum salary contracts. The Wizards acted like they were getting a steal.

Weirder yet, they never made an offer to their incumbent backup PG, A.J. Price, who was a) better last season than Maynor has ever been as a pro, and b) would have been happy to get the minimum salary for another year.

Then, with Ariza coming back for another year, having drafted Porter third overall, and having dealt to get Rice (a SG/SF type), Grunfeld gave the full MLE to bring back Webster — yet another SF. Now, Webster did play well last season, and his three-point shooting and heady play was certainly valuable to the team. But, having spent their draft picks on swing men and their BAE on a scrub PG, they still had gaping holes up front, and no way to fill them other than trading or signing minimum salary free agents.

They flirted with San Antonio’s DeJuan Blair, but presented with competing minimum salary offers, Blair chose Dallas. They did manage to sign Al Harrington — one of the more overrated players of the past decade, who was available at a deep discount because he’s 32 years old, coming off the worst season of his career (due to illness), and working his way back into shape after recovering from that illness.

And oh yeah, burning that BAE on Maynor knocked them out of the running for good reserve guards like Nate Robinson and Darren Collison — each of whom signed for the BAE or less.

Taken together, the Wizards spent all of their offseason assets without addressing their single biggest need: depth up front. In effect, they were gambling on the health and productivity of 30-plus year olds, and the insanity of that gamble became evident when Okafor herniated a disk in his neck. With an uncertain timetable for recovery, the Wizards were stuck. The team’s stated goal was to reach the playoffs — something that just wasn’t going to happen if they had to rely on Kevin Seraphin and Jan Vesely, who were two of league’s least productive players last season.

And so, staring into the maw of yet another 30-win season, Grunfeld and Leonsis blinked. They swapped Okafor (who may not play this season) and a first round pick for Gortat, who played at borderline All-NBA caliber a couple years ago. Make no mistake: Gortat is a good player. But here’s the problem — the Wizards spent a future asset on a guy they’re hoping will be on the team for just one year. See, during the summer, Leonsis talked openly about signing a “brand name” free agent. That’s something they’ll need cap room to accomplish, and the only way they’ll have cap space is if they let Gortat depart.

Perhaps the most prevalent counterargument in favor of this trade is that the pick is top 12 protected in 2014 and that good players aren’t usually picked that late in the draft. This is unpersuasive to me because it ignores the reality that in every NBA draft, quality players are selected 13th or lower. Sure, a GM like Grunfeld has a lower probability of finding a good player later in the draft, but that’s a point in favor of keeping picks and acquiring extras, if possible. More picks increase the odds of getting a quality player. Now that’s not even an option.

Another line of argument is that the Wizards could re-sign Gortat, which would make the trade look better for the team. The problem with this thinking is that it would mean the team struck out in free agency (or decided not to even take a swing). Gortat is good, but he’s most certainly not a “brand name” free agent. Plus, Gortat turns 30 next spring, which means he’s more likely to be in the expensive decline portion of his career than he is to remain productive.

It seems like such a classically Wizards transaction. Presented with opportunities to build a potential title contender, the owner and the GM opted to pursue short-term goals that don’t mean much. I find it cynical and disappointing. Makes we wonder why I’m still following this team. But that’s a topic for another day.

The Leonsis Interview with Mike Wise: Some Thoughts In Response

Washington Post columnist Mike Wise sat down with Wizards owner Ted Leonsis for a 45-minute interview. The transcript is here, and I recommend reading the whole thing. I’m going to pull out a few of Ted’s comments that I think are worth commentary and/or analysis.

First, though — kudos to Ted for doing the interview at all. I disagree with much of what he says, but I appreciate his openness and willingness to face reporter questions. It’s more than a lot of owners do.

Leonsis: Wall, Crawford and Beal, that’s a pretty good three-guard rotation. We want to bring in a seasoned backup point guard. … And so what our belief is, we’re hoping John Wall and Beal become real stars that we keep and kind of build around them. Can Wall and Beal and Crawford one day be Isiah, Dumars and the Microwave? Right, I mean, that would be a pretty good backcourt.

I wish Ted had included “potentially” in this comment because it’s not a good three-guard rotation. And yeah, Isiah, Dumars and Vinny Johnson did make a good backcourt. But let’s be real: none of the Wizards “trio” have proven to be “good” NBA players. Wall has been average. His “glory stats” (per game points, rebounds and assists) look pretty good, but his shooting has been atrocious and his overall efficiency (including turnovers) has been awful.

Crawford is bad — one of the least efficient high usage players in league history. Since the NBA implemented the 3pt shot in 1979-80 there have been 930 player seasons in which a player received at least 1500 total minutes and had a usage rate of 25% or higher. Crawford ranks 907th in  individual offensive rating (individual points produced per 100 individual possessions).

During that span, there have been 851 player seasons with an individual offensive rating at least 3 points per 100 possessions better than Crawford. If we limit the look to players in their first two seasons, there have been 121 player seasons fitting the criteria above. Crawford ranks 108th on that list. Virtually anyone in the NBA could score as many points as Crawford did last season if he shot as frequently.

Beal, of course, has played zero minutes in the NBA. I predict that he’ll be a good player. In my draft analysis, Beal’s score in YODA was similar to freshman SGs like Michael Jordan, Clyde Drexler and Vince Carter. So there’s hope.

Leonsis: That’s why I looked at are we better at using our money in space to get Okafor and Ariza, then hoping and praying that we can get a free agent that believes and wants to come here. Then you hope while making a free-agent deal, those deals are pretty high-priced. Two years.

I understand what Ted’s hoping to do by using the cap space on Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza, but I think it’s a bad strategy. As I wrote a few days ago, they would have been smarter to buy out Rashard Lewis and amnesty Blatche, and then used the resulting cap space to outbid Dallas for Elton Brand (amnestied by Philly and picked up by the Mavericks for $2.1 million), outbid San Antonio for Danny Green (hugely underrated and re-signed for $4 million per season — an absolute bargain), and outbid Atlanta for Lou Williams (an efficient, 3rd guard type who signed for the mid-level exception). And they still could have had $8-9 million in cap room next offseason.

What the Wizards have done is buy a couple years of mediocrity at best. And at the end of those two years, they won’t be in position to pursue free agents because they’ll need to re-sign John Wall (they hope) and they’ll have other contracts coming due for extensions and renewals. This was their shot to use their cap space to add young players who fit their rebuild — they spent it on Okafor and Ariza.

Leonsis: We’ve made big investments in the analytic side and the technology side. … Besides our in-house guys, we have one cool guy: Joe Sill. Joe presents on occasion at that stats thing at MIT. Double-math PHd. He’s almost like a technical trader on Wall St. I can pick a company you should invest in. He’ll never meet the CEO, but he knows from the numbers which ones to pick. …

I do think there is a big, big role in informing some decisions. Also, that the little things have value. Our defensive rebounding — and the defensive rebounding stats of our guards — improved dramatically when Nene came and JaVale left. So, getting guards who can rebound becomes important. If your forwards are pushing their men out, that’s not a stat. That’s something you follow. That means the guards have the opportunity to get the rebounds and initiate their own break. Teaching rebounding becomes important. So Beal is a real good rebounder as a guard who fits really good with what we’re trying to do.

I’m a stat guy, so I like that they’re investing in analytics. Joe Sill is a “regularized adjusted plus minus” guy, and definitely a smart guy. The “promise” of RAPM is that it’s results are more accurate than straight (APM) because of something called “ridge regression,” which reduces standard errors. RAPM and APM are numbers I pay attention to, but I’m dubious about their utility because I’m not persuaded that the proponents fully understand all the factors that go into the “adjustment.”

Leonsis:

We’re also one of the few teams have installed this super heat-seeking missile cameras. Have you heard about this? We have these HD cameras. Another Stanford kid does it for us. This thing creates real-time heat maps. Literally you can get down to the pixels on the floor. Where are the shots being taken, where are the shots being made, where are the picks being made. It does interesting things like, how many dribbles on a fast break does your guard hold the ball before he dishes off, and was their a good shot made versus other guards in the league.

How does this work in practice: You tell a guard you were negating your speed by dribbling two more times. And then, when you dribble only three times and then you dish, we convert 70 percent of the time. All of this data then gets used in practice, like, in coaching sessions.”

I’ll tell you a lesson I learned 10 years ago with Ron Wilson and Adam Oates. I’ll never forget this. Adam Oates was the [quarterback] of our power play. Adam didn’t even know he was doing it, but he would put his skate up against the wall and bring that skate down and then get that pass. When the [power play] became not productive, he stopped doing that, and he was collecting the puck just a little further away, seven or eight inches away, from the half board.

The entire geometry of the ice changed, six or seven inches. Rob Wilson showed him, I remember, and said, ‘Just do that: Put your skate against the board.’ The power play came back. So that to me, as an owner, was the first indication that a little thing reviewed, fixed, coached can have unbelievable, big positive impact.

So we wanted to use as many tools as we can to try to give us advantage, and bringing in some of these coaches from winning programs. Bringing in these analytics, bringing in high IQ, good people it’s all a part of trying to change a losing culture to a winning culture.

This sounds really cool, and I’d love to analyze the take. The information is ultimately going to be as good as the analyst, and hopefully the team has good ones in place.

Interesting exchange between Wise and Ted about Blatche:

Q. I was reading quotes from two years ago about how much you thought signing Blatche to an extension was a great idea. Two years later, does this qualify as your biggest disappointment of owning the Wizards’ thus far?

A. Yes — we made a mistake — although the NBA has had close to $250 million of amnestied players to date — sometimes you get a chance to take a mulligan under the new rules and that is what we did.

Q. Who bears the most responsibility for the fact that he didn’t work out in Washington?

A. We are all in it together — so we are all to blame. Buck has to stop with me though as owner. I appreciate Andray’s apology to the fans and I hope he is able to turn around his career.

Q. Given your belief in redemption, was it particularly hard to cut him loose?

A. No, it wasnt. It was in best interest of franchise.

Ultimately, the person who bears responsibility for Blatche’s failure in Washington is Blatche himself. Had he worked hard, played hard and had a better attitude, he’d still be with the team and he’d be productive. He had ability. He just never put in what was necessary to come close to maximizing it.

On the (to me) difficult to understand decision to give Ernie Grunfeld another two years running the Wizards:

Leonsis: With Ernie what I found was, could we be on the same wavelength? Would he build team with eight or nine first-round picks? Could he make trades? I thought trading Gilbert was impossible. I thought trading Rashard was impossible.

It’s hard to even unpack what I think are faulty assumptions by Ted. Any player can be traded if you’re willing to pay the other guy’s price. They could trade Arenas because they took back a contract almost as bad. They were able to trade Lewis because they could solve all of New Orleans long-term salary cap issues with a single trade. And somehow, Grunfeld also gave up a 2nd round pick to make it happen. And New Orleans then used the cap room they acquired from the Wizards to trade for a 23-year old PF who happens to be supremely underrated.

I like several of the guys working for Grunfeld, but I have little belief that Grunfeld will build a title-contending team in Washington. The moves they made this offseason seem designed to get the Wizards in contention for the playoffs for the next two years. That is, contention for the 7th or 8th seed, not for a division title and a top 3-4 seed. To me, it’s a disappointment to see the team go for a sacrifice bunt when they had an opportunity to swing for the fences.

That said, I hope I’m wrong.