Category: Ted Leonsis

Wizards Off To Even Worse Start Than Last Season

wittman face

If you thought last season’s horrific start by the Washington Wizards couldn’t be duplicated, think again. Through their first three games of the years, the Wizards have been even worse than they were last year.

Season Ortg Drtg Diff PytW82
2013-14 102.7 112.4 -9.7 18.1
2012-13 92.3 99.0 -6.7 22.5
Change -10.4 13.4 -3.0 -4.4

Ortg = points scored per 100 possessions

Drtg = points allowed per 100 possessions

Diff = ortg – drtg (scoring/efficiency differential is a better measure of team strength than a team’s record)

PytW82 = “Diff” translated into projected wins if that differential was maintained over an 82-game schedule

As you can see from the table above, the Wizards have been 10.4 points per 100 possessions better offensively this season than last, BUT they’ve been 13.0 points per 100 possessions worse on defense. The net result: through three games, they’re -3.0 in efficiency differential — a change of 4.4 wins over the course of a full season.

Last season, the team was missing PG John Wall. This year, they’re missing both Nene and Emeka Okafor — two of the team’s more important defenders last season. Marcin Gortat, an adequate defender at best, has been slow to grasp the team’s defensive scheme.

Unfortunately, there probably aren’t any quick fixes to the defense. The team emphasized that end of the court during training camp, but it’s challenging to overcome the loss of quality defensive big men — they’re the linchpin of every good defense in the NBA.

Which, of course, leads to the obvious question: Why did the Wizards go through an offseason without addressing the critical need for depth behind its 30+ year old front line?

Which, of course, leads to another obvious question: Why does Ted Leonsis continue to let Ernie Grunfeld run his basketball team?

Wizards Plan Doesn’t Add Up

Wizards owner Ted Leonsis assures us fans that they have a plan and that they’re sticking to it. However, I think The Plan is a lot messier than it seems to be on the surface — and I don’t think it includes a clear and realistic path to building a championship contender.

What is The Plan exactly? It includes young players like John Wall, Bradley Beal and Otto Porter. It includes trading for veterans like Nene, Emeka Okafor, Trevor Ariza and (most recently) Morcin Gortat. It includes shopping for what Leonsis called a “brand name” free agent. That aspect of The Plan was articulated well by Daniel Friedberg at RealGM. Wrote Friedberg:

The recent transactions by the Wizards (the Marcin Gortat trade, declining the fourth year options of Jan Vesely and Chris Singleton) will give them $15 million in cap space in the summer of 2014, making them major players in free agency. That exact amount also depends on what they choose to do with Gortat. While all the sorcery in the world won’t bring LeBron, Carmelo or Bosh to the nation’s capital, a playoff run this year will make this squad more of a draw for lower tier free agents. After a half decade of basement-dwelling drudgery, the Wiz faithful finally have reason for optimism.

But how much optimism is warranted? The Wizards could indeed have $15 million (or even a little more) in cap room next offseason. All they have to do is renounce Gortat, Ariza, Trevor Booker, Jan Vesely, Kevin Seraphin and Chris Singleton. The last three don’t matter much. They’re bad NBA players and will be gone after the season.

If the Wizards are to make a playoff run this season, Gortat and Ariza will be major contributors, and Booker is likely to be at least a significant part of the rotation. A Wizards “get into the playoffs” rotation is probably going to include Wall and Eric Maynor as the PGs, Beal and Martell Webster or Garrett Temple as the SGs, Ariza and Webster as the SFs (with a possible contribution from Porter), Nene, Booker and Harrington at PF, and Gortat and Nene at center.

That rotation will have to look something like this:

  • PG: Wall and Maynor
  • SG: Beal and Webster/Temple
  • SF: Ariza and Webster
  • PF: Nene and Booker/Harrington
  • C: Gortat and Nene

It’s at this point that the “logic” of the whole getting into the playoffs will make the Wizards more attractive to free agents part of The Plan breaks down. If the Wizards sign a significant free agent next offseason, that free agent cannot be addition. Since the team can’t have cap space unless it’s willing to give up Gortat, Ariza, Booker, etc., any free agent signing will be replacement of those players. In effect, they’ll be trading the departed players for the new guy.

So, put yourself in the mind of a “brand name” free agent. If you’re interested in playing for a winner, why would you pick the Wizards? The group that “won” (meaning they got into the playoffs) can’t be kept together if the team decides to sign you. Key contributors would have to be let go — guys without whom Washington would have missed the postseason.

In other words, a potential free agent can’t go to the Wizards to “join” a winning team — he has to take the place of important contributors and hope that what he has to offer plus the continued development of the team’s remaining players is enough to do more than keep the team treading water. I don’t see how that package would be attractive to a prominent free agent who wants to compete for a championship.

The Wizards’ cap situation provides some flexibility, which is a positive. If the salary cap rises to $62 million (which is what’s expected), Washington could clear as much as $16 million in cap space. That sounds like a lot, but when the cap increases, maximum salaries increase as well. That $16 million would be sufficient to pay a maximum salary to a player with 0-6 years of experience, but would fall short for players with 7-9 years or 10+ years.

If the Wizards decide to let everyone leave so they can sign Chris Bosh, they’ll either need to convince Bosh to take a starting salary $4.2 million less than the maximum he could receive — and $4.5 million less than he’s due to receive under his current contract — OR work a sign and trade with Miami OR trade away other players (like Beal or Porter) to clear additional cap space.

Let’s say they go after Detroit’s Greg Monroe instead. Monroe would have to take slightly less money (about $2.6 million over the four years of a maximum contract), AND Detroit would have to decide not to match. But let’s say all that happens. At that point, the Wizards would have eight players under contract and about $2 million in cap space to fill the rest of their roster — and they’d be working without a first round pick, which they traded to get Gortat. Who, in this scenario, would be playing elsewhere next season.

Which means, the team would continue to lack depth, especially up front where they’d be reliant on Monroe, an aging Nene and whatever they could get from the second round or the free agent “remnants” bin.

The question really comes down to this: What goals does the front office really have? If the Wizards are serious about contending for a championship with this group, the path to contender status is heavily reliant on player development and hoping to get lucky in free agency or the draft. If their goal is to make the playoffs and then see if they can go on a lucky run, they’re probably setting themselves up to make moves that will keep them treading water.

All that said, the team could still become a title contender if some combination of Wall, Beal or Porter develop into true franchise players. The front office has already committed to Wall as its franchise bedrock with the absolute maximum contract they could give him. Wall hasn’t shown to be worth that kind of money yet, though his breakthrough may be coming.

Beal’s rookie season was a lot like Ray Allen’s, a guy who will be in the Hall of Fame, but wasn’t a true franchise player. Porter, of course, is a question mark — his hip injury has kept him on the sidelines. As a college prospect, he graded as a good-but-not-great prospect.

I’m definitely not saying the team is going to stink. They have sufficient resources to be a perennial playoff team for the next few seasons. That path to being a title contender is less clear, however. The two major trades the past couple years (acquiring Okafor and Ariza; then trading Okafor and a first for Gortat) don’t really look like the moves a team aspiring to win a championship in the near future would make. They seem more like the moves of a team content to make the playoffs in the short term, but without a genuine plan to transition from playoff contender to championship contender.

My expectation for the 2014 offseason is that the team will essentially punt on free agency. My guess: they’ll re-sign Gortat and Ariza to four-year contracts in the name of continuity, and use the MLE to add frontcourt depth rather than taking a plunge in the free agent waters. Then they’ll hope that development from Wall, Beal and Porter will be enough to make them title contenders before age and injury wear down their 30-plus year olds up front.

It’s not the way I would have done it, but there’s at least a chance it could work.

Projection: Wizards Will Win 43 and Make Playoffs This Season

Will John Wall make The Leap to All-Star status this season?

NBA preseason doesn’t mean an awful lot. It’s perhaps a bit more important for a team like the Wizards — a bad team trying to get into the playoffs for the first time in awhile. But even then the information it provides isn’t all that…informative.

The regular season Wizards will get a significant boost from the preseason Wizards because of their move last Friday to acquire center Marcin Gortat. The veteran takes the spot vacated by the injured Emeka Okafor, who was sent to Phoenix (along with a first round pick).

I’ll get to my projection/prediction for the season in a moment, but first, a look at the preseason numbers. I’m not wasting time with the team-level stuff. The Wizards were terrible on offense and excellent on defense during the exhibition games. That’s theoretically a way to win games — a 68-65 win counts as much in the standings as one that’s 114-111. Still, being good on both ends would be preferable. If there’s any takeaway from the team-level preseason numbers it’s that the team was similar to the one they had last year (not surprising considering their few personnel changes), which was characterized by terrible offense and excellent defense.

Looking at the individuals, I’d conclude that most of the roster underwhelmed. Bradley Beal and Trevor Booker played well; Nene was okay, but not performing at the level he’s maintained throughout his career; and the rest…pretty bad. John Wall, the guy they’re building around, was awful. He shot badly from everywhere (.415 from two-point range; .118 from three-point range; just .727 from the free throw line), and committing 4.4 turnovers per 36 minutes.

Below is a table showing an “estimated” Player Production Average (PPA) for each player. I say “estimated” because PPA is based on league average season by season. That average is fairly consistent year to year, but there are fluctuations. Since it’s preseason, there isn’t enough data to calculate a true league “average” so I use an approximation of league average. Also, full PPA adjusts for pace, accounts for individual defense and includes a “degree of difficulty” factor — none of which I’m including in looking at the preseason numbers. In PPA, average is 100, higher is better, and replacement level is 45.

Player G MPG ePPA PPA
Bradley Beal 7 30.3 146 92
Trevor Booker 6 20.5 144 96
Nene 5 22.2 118 119
Glen Rice 6 14.0 70
Jan Vesely 7 20.3 67 19
Trevor Ariza 7 23.4 52 108
Martell Webster 6 23.5 49 114
Al Harrington 5 16.6 43  81
Eric Maynor 6 21.0 38 32
Kevin Seraphin 7 25.9 27 22
Garrett Temple 5 15.6 25 60
John Wall 7 28.1 12 139

That last column is the player’s PPA in 2012-13. Except for Al Harrington, who missed most of last season with a staph infection.

Again, don’t read too much into the preseason numbers. The play of Beal and Booker are hopeful signs. Also good to see Jan Vesely doing something positive on the floor — he actually led the team in rebounding in preseason.

I’m not overly worried about Wall’s poor play, although it would have been nice to see him pick up where he left off at the end of last season.

If you’re thinking you’ll see better play from Eric Maynor once the season begins, stop it. At best the Wizards are likely get replacement level production from him.

Other potential cautions: Martell Webster and Kevin Seraphin were bad. Webster’s play is potentially worrisome because he hasn’t established himself to the point where his production level is a given. Last year, he had a terrific preseason, and it translated into a solid regular season. This year? Hard to say.

Seraphin’s preseason performance, is unfortunately matches up with most of the data on him. He was inefficient, turnover prone and rebounded like a SF.

Ariza’s preseason stats don’t mean a whole lot. He’s well-established and fairly consistent. He’ll provide the team with another season of stellar defense and meh offense, which will grade out to about average.

2013-14 Projection

Given the team’s offseason moves, it was clear that the team’s fortunes this season rested on the health of three players: Wall, Nene and Okafor. Now that they’ve traded for Gortat, their fortunes rest on the health of three players: Wall, Nene and Gortat. They don’t have quality depth behind any of these three.

While my projection relies on statistical data, there’s a fair amount of guesswork in divvying up minutes. The table below shows my estimates of games played, minutes played, and PPA. The estimates for games and minutes are a combination of player history, analysis of similar players in the NBA record, and logic. PPA estimates incorporate each player’s individual performance history, analysis of historical similars, and aging effects.

POS  Player  G MPG LS 2013-14
PG John Wall 66 35.8 139 160
PG Eric Maynor 75 13.0 32 34
G Garrett Temple 60 10.9 60 45
SG Glen Rice 42 11.4 75
SG Bradley Beal 68 34.0 92 108
SF Otto Porter 41 20.0 75
SF Trevor Ariza 61 29.6 108 105
SF Martell Webster 60 24.6 114 97
PF Nene 62 29.1 119 146
PF Chris Singleton 34 10.0 24 43
PF Jan Veseley 60 10.0 19 51
PF Al Harrington 66 18.0 81 78
PF Trevor Booker 58 19.7 96 106
C Marcin Gortat 74 29.0 125 146
C Kevin Seraphin 69 18.2 22 46

LS = last season, except for Harrington.

My approach projects Wall making The Leap to All-Star level production, whether he makes the team or not. It also projects significant improvement from Beal, although it suggests he’s another year from making The Leap himself. I’m also expecting bounce-back years in per minute production from Nene and Gortat.

I’m expecting regression from Webster both in terms of overall production and in health.

I crunched the numbers on several different scenarios. In a best-case situation that assumes near perfect health, the Wizards could win 48 games. My worst case projection has them at 34 wins.

Final prediction: 43-39, and the Wizards get the 7th seed in the playoffs.

For those who are curious, here’s how the projections looked with the various possibilities between Okafor, Gortat and neither.

  • Current roster (with Gortat): 43-39
  • With healthy Okafor: 42-40
  • Without Gortat or Okafor (no trade): 38-44

Gortat Trade Is Culmination of Series of Bad Moves for Wizards

Late Friday afternoon, news emerged that the Washington Wizards had traded injured center Emeka Okafor and a first round pick to the Phoenix Suns for center Marcin Gortat and salary cap ballast. While Gortat is a good player who will help the Wizards more games than they would have with Okafor sidelined, it’s a terrible move for a rebuilding franchise.

Unfortunately for fans who had hoped to see Ted Leonsis and Ernie Grunfeld construct a team that could contend for championships in the near future, it’s merely another example of the team squandering opportunities and mismanaging its assets. In the summer of 2012, for example, the Wizards could have amnestied Andray Blatche and released Rashard Lewis — moves that would have carved out enough cap space to acquire a quality front court player, sign good young players to mid-priced contracts, AND preserved future cap space for possible future free agents.

Instead, they traded for Okafor and Trevor Ariza — both of whom figured to be two-year rentals, at best. While the rebuilding Wizards added a 30-year old Okafor to pair up front with the 31-year old Nene, rebuilding New Orleans used the cap space they’d obtained from the Wizards to acquire Ryan Anderson — a productive 24-year old power forward.

This offseason was even worse. After last season, the team’s biggest need was obvious: front court depth. Okafor and Nene were reasonably effective, but both were 30-plus years old — an age at which NBA players typically see declines in productivity and increases in time missed due to injury.

So, they went into the offseason stocked with these assets:

  • Promising starters in the backcourt (John Wall and Bradley Beal)
  • A solid SF in the final year of his contract (Ariza)
  • The third overall pick in the draft
  • Two second round picks
  • The Bi-Annual Exception (BAE)
  • The Mid-Level Exception (MLE)

They used that draft pick on SF Otto Porter, who should be a good professional player once he’s healthy. In my pre-draft analysis, I had Porter rated in a tie for fourth overall, so picking him third wasn’t much of a stretch. And, the difference between Porter and at least two of the guys I had ahead of him (Cody Zeller and Nerlens Noel) was small enough that reasonable minds could differ on which of the three projected to be the best pro.

They swapped their 2nd round picks to move up a spot and take Glen Rice Jr., which might work out as a decent move. My analysis of his D-League performance suggests Rice may have been worth a mid-first round selection — he could turn out to be a terrific value as a 2nd rounder.

But here’s where things got puzzling. On the first day of free agency, they spent their BAE to sign reserve PG Eric Maynor — a consistently crummy NBA player. Guys who performed like Maynor are ones teams invite to training camp on non-guaranteed minimum salary contracts. The Wizards acted like they were getting a steal.

Weirder yet, they never made an offer to their incumbent backup PG, A.J. Price, who was a) better last season than Maynor has ever been as a pro, and b) would have been happy to get the minimum salary for another year.

Then, with Ariza coming back for another year, having drafted Porter third overall, and having dealt to get Rice (a SG/SF type), Grunfeld gave the full MLE to bring back Webster — yet another SF. Now, Webster did play well last season, and his three-point shooting and heady play was certainly valuable to the team. But, having spent their draft picks on swing men and their BAE on a scrub PG, they still had gaping holes up front, and no way to fill them other than trading or signing minimum salary free agents.

They flirted with San Antonio’s DeJuan Blair, but presented with competing minimum salary offers, Blair chose Dallas. They did manage to sign Al Harrington — one of the more overrated players of the past decade, who was available at a deep discount because he’s 32 years old, coming off the worst season of his career (due to illness), and working his way back into shape after recovering from that illness.

And oh yeah, burning that BAE on Maynor knocked them out of the running for good reserve guards like Nate Robinson and Darren Collison — each of whom signed for the BAE or less.

Taken together, the Wizards spent all of their offseason assets without addressing their single biggest need: depth up front. In effect, they were gambling on the health and productivity of 30-plus year olds, and the insanity of that gamble became evident when Okafor herniated a disk in his neck. With an uncertain timetable for recovery, the Wizards were stuck. The team’s stated goal was to reach the playoffs — something that just wasn’t going to happen if they had to rely on Kevin Seraphin and Jan Vesely, who were two of league’s least productive players last season.

And so, staring into the maw of yet another 30-win season, Grunfeld and Leonsis blinked. They swapped Okafor (who may not play this season) and a first round pick for Gortat, who played at borderline All-NBA caliber a couple years ago. Make no mistake: Gortat is a good player. But here’s the problem — the Wizards spent a future asset on a guy they’re hoping will be on the team for just one year. See, during the summer, Leonsis talked openly about signing a “brand name” free agent. That’s something they’ll need cap room to accomplish, and the only way they’ll have cap space is if they let Gortat depart.

Perhaps the most prevalent counterargument in favor of this trade is that the pick is top 12 protected in 2014 and that good players aren’t usually picked that late in the draft. This is unpersuasive to me because it ignores the reality that in every NBA draft, quality players are selected 13th or lower. Sure, a GM like Grunfeld has a lower probability of finding a good player later in the draft, but that’s a point in favor of keeping picks and acquiring extras, if possible. More picks increase the odds of getting a quality player. Now that’s not even an option.

Another line of argument is that the Wizards could re-sign Gortat, which would make the trade look better for the team. The problem with this thinking is that it would mean the team struck out in free agency (or decided not to even take a swing). Gortat is good, but he’s most certainly not a “brand name” free agent. Plus, Gortat turns 30 next spring, which means he’s more likely to be in the expensive decline portion of his career than he is to remain productive.

It seems like such a classically Wizards transaction. Presented with opportunities to build a potential title contender, the owner and the GM opted to pursue short-term goals that don’t mean much. I find it cynical and disappointing. Makes we wonder why I’m still following this team. But that’s a topic for another day.

The Leonsis Interview with Mike Wise: Some Thoughts In Response

Washington Post columnist Mike Wise sat down with Wizards owner Ted Leonsis for a 45-minute interview. The transcript is here, and I recommend reading the whole thing. I’m going to pull out a few of Ted’s comments that I think are worth commentary and/or analysis.

First, though — kudos to Ted for doing the interview at all. I disagree with much of what he says, but I appreciate his openness and willingness to face reporter questions. It’s more than a lot of owners do.

Leonsis: Wall, Crawford and Beal, that’s a pretty good three-guard rotation. We want to bring in a seasoned backup point guard. … And so what our belief is, we’re hoping John Wall and Beal become real stars that we keep and kind of build around them. Can Wall and Beal and Crawford one day be Isiah, Dumars and the Microwave? Right, I mean, that would be a pretty good backcourt.

I wish Ted had included “potentially” in this comment because it’s not a good three-guard rotation. And yeah, Isiah, Dumars and Vinny Johnson did make a good backcourt. But let’s be real: none of the Wizards “trio” have proven to be “good” NBA players. Wall has been average. His “glory stats” (per game points, rebounds and assists) look pretty good, but his shooting has been atrocious and his overall efficiency (including turnovers) has been awful.

Crawford is bad — one of the least efficient high usage players in league history. Since the NBA implemented the 3pt shot in 1979-80 there have been 930 player seasons in which a player received at least 1500 total minutes and had a usage rate of 25% or higher. Crawford ranks 907th in  individual offensive rating (individual points produced per 100 individual possessions).

During that span, there have been 851 player seasons with an individual offensive rating at least 3 points per 100 possessions better than Crawford. If we limit the look to players in their first two seasons, there have been 121 player seasons fitting the criteria above. Crawford ranks 108th on that list. Virtually anyone in the NBA could score as many points as Crawford did last season if he shot as frequently.

Beal, of course, has played zero minutes in the NBA. I predict that he’ll be a good player. In my draft analysis, Beal’s score in YODA was similar to freshman SGs like Michael Jordan, Clyde Drexler and Vince Carter. So there’s hope.

Leonsis: That’s why I looked at are we better at using our money in space to get Okafor and Ariza, then hoping and praying that we can get a free agent that believes and wants to come here. Then you hope while making a free-agent deal, those deals are pretty high-priced. Two years.

I understand what Ted’s hoping to do by using the cap space on Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza, but I think it’s a bad strategy. As I wrote a few days ago, they would have been smarter to buy out Rashard Lewis and amnesty Blatche, and then used the resulting cap space to outbid Dallas for Elton Brand (amnestied by Philly and picked up by the Mavericks for $2.1 million), outbid San Antonio for Danny Green (hugely underrated and re-signed for $4 million per season — an absolute bargain), and outbid Atlanta for Lou Williams (an efficient, 3rd guard type who signed for the mid-level exception). And they still could have had $8-9 million in cap room next offseason.

What the Wizards have done is buy a couple years of mediocrity at best. And at the end of those two years, they won’t be in position to pursue free agents because they’ll need to re-sign John Wall (they hope) and they’ll have other contracts coming due for extensions and renewals. This was their shot to use their cap space to add young players who fit their rebuild — they spent it on Okafor and Ariza.

Leonsis: We’ve made big investments in the analytic side and the technology side. … Besides our in-house guys, we have one cool guy: Joe Sill. Joe presents on occasion at that stats thing at MIT. Double-math PHd. He’s almost like a technical trader on Wall St. I can pick a company you should invest in. He’ll never meet the CEO, but he knows from the numbers which ones to pick. …

I do think there is a big, big role in informing some decisions. Also, that the little things have value. Our defensive rebounding — and the defensive rebounding stats of our guards — improved dramatically when Nene came and JaVale left. So, getting guards who can rebound becomes important. If your forwards are pushing their men out, that’s not a stat. That’s something you follow. That means the guards have the opportunity to get the rebounds and initiate their own break. Teaching rebounding becomes important. So Beal is a real good rebounder as a guard who fits really good with what we’re trying to do.

I’m a stat guy, so I like that they’re investing in analytics. Joe Sill is a “regularized adjusted plus minus” guy, and definitely a smart guy. The “promise” of RAPM is that it’s results are more accurate than straight (APM) because of something called “ridge regression,” which reduces standard errors. RAPM and APM are numbers I pay attention to, but I’m dubious about their utility because I’m not persuaded that the proponents fully understand all the factors that go into the “adjustment.”

Leonsis:

We’re also one of the few teams have installed this super heat-seeking missile cameras. Have you heard about this? We have these HD cameras. Another Stanford kid does it for us. This thing creates real-time heat maps. Literally you can get down to the pixels on the floor. Where are the shots being taken, where are the shots being made, where are the picks being made. It does interesting things like, how many dribbles on a fast break does your guard hold the ball before he dishes off, and was their a good shot made versus other guards in the league.

How does this work in practice: You tell a guard you were negating your speed by dribbling two more times. And then, when you dribble only three times and then you dish, we convert 70 percent of the time. All of this data then gets used in practice, like, in coaching sessions.”

I’ll tell you a lesson I learned 10 years ago with Ron Wilson and Adam Oates. I’ll never forget this. Adam Oates was the [quarterback] of our power play. Adam didn’t even know he was doing it, but he would put his skate up against the wall and bring that skate down and then get that pass. When the [power play] became not productive, he stopped doing that, and he was collecting the puck just a little further away, seven or eight inches away, from the half board.

The entire geometry of the ice changed, six or seven inches. Rob Wilson showed him, I remember, and said, ‘Just do that: Put your skate against the board.’ The power play came back. So that to me, as an owner, was the first indication that a little thing reviewed, fixed, coached can have unbelievable, big positive impact.

So we wanted to use as many tools as we can to try to give us advantage, and bringing in some of these coaches from winning programs. Bringing in these analytics, bringing in high IQ, good people it’s all a part of trying to change a losing culture to a winning culture.

This sounds really cool, and I’d love to analyze the take. The information is ultimately going to be as good as the analyst, and hopefully the team has good ones in place.

Interesting exchange between Wise and Ted about Blatche:

Q. I was reading quotes from two years ago about how much you thought signing Blatche to an extension was a great idea. Two years later, does this qualify as your biggest disappointment of owning the Wizards’ thus far?

A. Yes — we made a mistake — although the NBA has had close to $250 million of amnestied players to date — sometimes you get a chance to take a mulligan under the new rules and that is what we did.

Q. Who bears the most responsibility for the fact that he didn’t work out in Washington?

A. We are all in it together — so we are all to blame. Buck has to stop with me though as owner. I appreciate Andray’s apology to the fans and I hope he is able to turn around his career.

Q. Given your belief in redemption, was it particularly hard to cut him loose?

A. No, it wasnt. It was in best interest of franchise.

Ultimately, the person who bears responsibility for Blatche’s failure in Washington is Blatche himself. Had he worked hard, played hard and had a better attitude, he’d still be with the team and he’d be productive. He had ability. He just never put in what was necessary to come close to maximizing it.

On the (to me) difficult to understand decision to give Ernie Grunfeld another two years running the Wizards:

Leonsis: With Ernie what I found was, could we be on the same wavelength? Would he build team with eight or nine first-round picks? Could he make trades? I thought trading Gilbert was impossible. I thought trading Rashard was impossible.

It’s hard to even unpack what I think are faulty assumptions by Ted. Any player can be traded if you’re willing to pay the other guy’s price. They could trade Arenas because they took back a contract almost as bad. They were able to trade Lewis because they could solve all of New Orleans long-term salary cap issues with a single trade. And somehow, Grunfeld also gave up a 2nd round pick to make it happen. And New Orleans then used the cap room they acquired from the Wizards to trade for a 23-year old PF who happens to be supremely underrated.

I like several of the guys working for Grunfeld, but I have little belief that Grunfeld will build a title-contending team in Washington. The moves they made this offseason seem designed to get the Wizards in contention for the playoffs for the next two years. That is, contention for the 7th or 8th seed, not for a division title and a top 3-4 seed. To me, it’s a disappointment to see the team go for a sacrifice bunt when they had an opportunity to swing for the fences.

That said, I hope I’m wrong.